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sustaining activities survive constitutional scrutiny when the Supreme Court
has often said the nation should speak with “one voice” on foreign affairs?
The analysis of several different cross-border climate agreements
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has challenged in court. Under the Compact Clause, the presumed
constitutionality of existing agreements between states and foreign
governments largely turns on the assumption that the interstate doctrine
applies. Under the Supremacy Clause, the Supreme Court’s expansive
reading of executive power could be interpreted to give preemptive effect to
President Trump’s repudiation of the Paris Agreement. If California’s
emissions trading program is perceived as a tax under the dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause, then the requirement that the nation speak with one voice
on international commerce could be violated.
However, two trends—one legal and one factual—suggest otherwise.
First, the legal and historical justifications for foreign affairs exceptionalism
may make less sense in today’s society than at our nation’s founding. Recent
cases suggest that the Supreme Court may be more likely to treat foreign
affairs like domestic matters, at least where national security is not at issue.
Second, when one considers the other ways in which state and local
governments have engaged in the grey zone of foreign affairs law—such as
by conducting trade and investment missions, entering into agreements to
facilitate cross-border legal processes, and engaging in human rights treaty
processes—subnational climate actions do not seem so extraordinary. Even
the agreement creating the California-Quebec emissions trading program is
similar to other cross-border activities, such as an agreement between New
York and Quebec on driver’s licenses and an agreement between states and
provinces on the Great Lakes. Through a unique analysis that situates
subnational climate change agreements within a broader legal and factual
context, this Article argues that cross-border climate action by states and
cities is well-positioned to survive constitutional scrutiny.
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INTRODUCTION
States and cities have long been leaders on global climate change.
Since the 1990s, states and cities have developed active climate policies in
response to the dearth of federal action, entered into transnational
agreements, and participated actively in international climate meetings.1
These subnational efforts have taken on a new importance in the wake of
President Trump’s repudiation of the Paris Agreement on climate change.2
But these actions raise an important question. How can states and cities
engage on international climate issues given that the Supreme Court has often
said that the nation should speak with “one voice” on foreign affairs?3
1

See Part I.B.
On November 4, 2019, the United States submitted a formal notification of withdrawal
from the Paris Agreement to the United Nations. Press Statement, Michael R. Pompeo,
Sec’y, Dep’t of State, On the U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement (Nov. 4, 2019),
https://www.state.gov/on-the-u-s-withdrawal-from-the-paris-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/
SU3P-F8BP]. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States remains a party to the Paris
Agreement until November 4, 2020. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change
Conference of Parties, 21st Session, Adoption of the Paris Agreement art. 28, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (Dec. 12, 2015) [hereinafter Paris Agreement]. See Part III.B for
additional discussion.
3
See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000) (discussing the
importance of the President’s capacity “to speak for the Nation with one voice in dealing with
2
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The Constitution empowers the national government with exclusive
power over certain aspects of foreign affairs, such as the authority to enter
into treaties and appoint ambassadors under Article II.4 Congress and the
President both have the power to expressly preempt state action.5 The federal
government can regulate and limit state agreements with foreign nations;
however, such state agreements are not treaties within the meaning of Article
II.6 The federal government can also conclude Article II treaties on topics that
would normally fall within the boundaries of traditional state power, and
when it does, those treaties preempt inconsistent state law.7
The Constitution, however, does not expressly prohibit states from
engaging in any and all activities that could impact foreign affairs.8 If the
federal government fails to take affirmative action, the exact scope of state
and local authority to engage in foreign affairs is unclear. Thus, although the
Supreme Court has sometimes said that the federal government has exclusive
authority over foreign affairs,9 in fact, no affirmative textual basis exists in
the Constitution for that perception.10 Rather, it is more accurate to say that
other governments”); Japan Line v. Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979) (discussing the federal
government’s need for a uniform voice given its role in regulating foreign commerce).
4
The Constitution at Article II, §2 sets out:
[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States . . . .
U.S. CONST. art. II, §2.
5
See Part III.A.
6
See Part II.A.
7
See Part III.C.
8
For example, Congress has the power to declare war, U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, but states are
not completely prohibited from engaging in war. Rather, the Constitution states that “[n]o
state shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . engage in war, unless actually invaded, or
in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.” Id. art. I, §10; see also MICHAEL J.
GLENNON & ROBERT D. SLOANE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS FEDERALISM: THE MYTH OF NATIONAL
EXCLUSIVITY 87 (2016) (recognizing that “the Constitution does not tell us what states may
do in the realm of foreign affairs—either categorically or without congressional consent”).
9
See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942) (“Power over external affairs is
not shared by the States; it is vested in the national government exclusively.”); Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (“The Federal Government . . . is entrusted with full and
exclusive responsibility for the conduct of affairs with foreign sovereignties.”); United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (describing the President as having
“exclusive power” over “international relations”).
10
GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 87–89, 131; see also Ingrid Wuerth, The Due
Process and Other Constitutional Rights of Foreign Nations, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 633, 653–
56 (2019) (making a historical and textual argument that Article III of the Constitution puts
cases between states and foreign nations within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
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the federal government theoretically has plenary power over foreign affairs,11
but that neither Congress nor the President have exercised this authority to its
fullest potential.12 The federal government’s failure to assert this authority
has created the grey zone of foreign affairs federalism, where states and cities
can engage globally but the scope of that power is not entirely clear.
As scholars have observed, a bright line does not necessarily exist
between “foreign” and “domestic” activities.13 This Article focuses on two
kinds of subnational action on climate change that implicate foreign affairs:
agreements that states and cities enter into with other national or subnational
governments (which can range from nonbinding pledges to more formal
agreements), and domestic coalitions that seek to participate in international
treaty forums.14
Legal scholars began to question the constitutional limits of state
actions on global climate change in the 2000s after the United States failed
to join the Kyoto Protocol and states like California began to adopt ambitious
greenhouse gas regulation policies and regional emissions trading programs.15
A large literature has since developed on the topic,16 and the subject has also
Court, which arguably suggests that the framers contemplated that states would continue to
have important relationships with foreign governments).
11
Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617,
1619 (1997).
12
GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 89 n.10.
13
See, e.g., Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations
Law, 128 HARV. L. REV 1897, 1907 n.28 (2015) (discussing the lack of clarity between
activities that are uniquely foreign or domestic).
14
See Part I.B. In either instance, state and local governments may publicly aspire to achieve,
or even directly incorporate elements of, international law. These actions could be understood
as a “download” of international law, Harold Hongju Koh, Why Transnational Law Matters,
24 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 745, 745–46 (2006), or as a “retroactive download” of international
norms. Sharmila L. Murthy, States and Cities as “Norm Sustainers”: A Role for Subnational
Actors in the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 31 (2019).
15
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky et al., California, Climate Change, and the Constitution, 25
ENVNTL. F. 50 (2008) (identifying potential constitutional hurdles to California’s greenhouse
gas mitigation efforts); Douglas A. Kysar & Bernadette A. Meyler, Like a Nation State, 55
UCLA L. REV. 1621 (2008) (discussing the constitutionality of California’s greenhouse gas
emissions trading system); Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming As a Public Nuisance, 30
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293 (2005) (discussing foreign policy preemption implications of a
climate change lawsuit brought on public nuisance grounds).
16
See, e.g., Danny Cullenward, California’s Foreign Climate Policy, 3 GLOBAL SUMMITRY
1 (2017) (discussing California’s climate change measures as a kind of foreign policy); David
Sloss, California’s Climate Diplomacy and Dormant Preemption, 56 WASHBURN L.J. 507
(2017) (analyzing California’s cap-and-trade agreement with Quebec under the Dormant
Foreign Commerce Clause, the Compact Clause, and dormant foreign affairs preemption);
Shelley Welton, State Dynamism, Federal Constraints: Possible Constitutional Hurdles to
Cross-Border Cap-and-Trade, 27 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T. 36 (2012) (analyzing the
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garnered interest from students writing law review notes.17 This Article builds
on that scholarship but makes a unique contribution to the existing analyses of
cross-border climate actions by states and cities in three distinct ways.
First, the scope of this analysis is much broader than any in the
existing literature. In contrast to articles that have only examined one aspect
of state and local action on global climate change,18 I consider the
constitutionality of a wide range of activities, including transnational
subnational climate networks, domestic coalitions that pledge to uphold the
Paris Agreement, and bilateral agreements between states and foreign
governments. I include an analysis of the cap-and-program program between
California and Quebec, which the Trump administration recently
challenged.19 I suggest that all of these activities are “norm sustaining” of
constitutionality of potential cross-border cap-and-trade programs); Augusta Wilson,
Linking Across Borders: Opportunities and Obstacles for a Joint Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative-Western Climate Initiative Market, 43 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 227 (2018) (examining
the potential for linking two regional cap and trade programs, the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative and the Western Climate Initiative); David V. Wright, Cross-Border Constraints
on Climate Change Agreements: Legal Risks in the California-Quebec Cap-and-Trade
Linkage, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,478 (2016) (probing potential legal challenges to the
California-Quebec cap-and-trade program).
17
See, e.g., Jessie A. Cammack, California, Climate, and Dormant Foreign Affairs
Preemption (Again), 65 UCLA L. REV. 1642 (2018) (discussing dormant foreign affairs
preemption precedent in the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit); Peter R. Jennetten, State
Environmental Agreements with Foreign Powers: The Compact Clause and the Foreign
Affairs Power of the States, 8 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 141 (1995) (discussing the foreign
affairs powers of the states in light of the Compact Clause); Jeremy Lawrence, The Western
Climate Initiative: Cross-Border Collaboration and Constitutional Structure in the United
States and Canada, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1225 (2009) (examining the possible constitutional
infirmities of the Western Climate Initiative); Kristin McCarthy, An American (State) in
Paris: The Constitutionality of U.S. States’ Commitments to the Paris Agreement, 48 ENVTL.
L. REP. 10977 (2018) (arguing that state participation in the Paris Agreement does not violate
the Supremacy Clause or Treaty Clause); Aaron Messing, Nonbinding Subnational
International Agreements: A Landscape Defined, 30 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 173 (2018)
(discussing four varieties of “nonbinding subnational international agreements” that are open
to states following the Paris Agreement); Note, Foreign Affairs Preemption and State
Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1877 (2006) (arguing that
state limits on greenhouse gases are not preempted by the federal foreign affairs power);
Note, The Compact Clause and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 120 HARV. L. REV.
1958 (2007) (discussing a categorical approach to the Compact Clause and its implications
for the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative).
18
Many articles have focused only on the cap-and-trade agreement between California and
Quebec. See e.g., Sloss, supra note 16. Other analyses only consider “nonbinding” state
commitments. See, e.g., McCarthy, supra note 17.
19
Amended Complaint, United States v. California, No. 2:19-cv-02142-WBS-EFB (E.D.
Cal. Nov. 19, 2019), ECF No. 7. This Article was written and accepted for publication before
this lawsuit was filed. The litigation began to unfold as this Article was being finalized for
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international climate law, a term I previously developed to explain how states
and cities can strengthen global legal norms when they take action consistent
with international agreements, such as the Paris Agreement.20 In addition,
because I examine these norm sustaining actions under the Compact and
Treaty Clauses, the Supremacy Clause, the dormant foreign affairs power,
and the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, the depth and breadth of the
constitutional analysis is greater than in the existing scholarship.21
Second, I situate subnational climate change activities in a wider
context by engaging with scholarly debates on foreign affairs federalism.
Historically, foreign affairs law—defined as the intersection between
constitutional law and international relations—has been perceived as unique,
with the Supreme Court applying greater scrutiny to activities of states that
have an international impact. Some scholars of foreign affairs federalism
have argued that foreign affairs law is increasingly becoming “normalized,”
i.e. that foreign affairs are being treated more like domestic matters.22
publication. Just before publication, the district court issued a decision rejecting the United
States’ summary judgment motion on the Treaty Clause and the Compact Clause causes of
action and granting California’s and other defendant’s cross-motions on the same issues.
Memorandum and Order re: Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, United States v.
California, No. 2:19-cv-02142 WBS EFB, 2020 WL 1182663 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2020). It
also issued an order rejecting the United States’ summary judgment motion on the foreign
affairs doctrine and granting the defendants’ cross-motions on that issue. Memorandum and
Order re: Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, No. 2:19-cv-02142 WBS EFB, 2020 WL
4043034 (E.D. Cal. July 17, 2020). The analysis in this Article is largely consistent with
these court decisions, but a full analysis of these opinions was not possible given the late
stage of the editing process of this Article.
20
Murthy, supra note 14. For example, by publicly benchmarking their own progress on U.S.
targets under the Paris Agreement, states and cities can signal to other nation-states that a
significant portion of the United States is still committed to the goals of the Paris Agreement.
This prior article focused exclusively on international law and assumed, for the purposes of
argument, that subnational global climate activity was constitutional. This theory of “norm
sustaining” draws heavily on Harold Koh’s theory of transnational legal process. Id. at 24–31;
Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 184 (1996).
21
Some articles only address one constitutional doctrine. See, e.g., Cammack, supra note 17.
Even those that consider a range of activities and doctrines do not have the same level of
depth of analysis as this Article. See, e.g., Welton, supra note 16.
22
See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 13 (arguing that normalization of foreign affairs
scrutiny is due in part to the breakdown in distinct categories of domestic versus foreign
affairs); Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223 (1999)
(arguing that the “exclusivity principle, under which the federal government alone enjoys the
capacity to conduct the nation’s foreign relation” is becoming obsolete); Peter J. Spiro,
Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 649–730 (2002)
(questioning the so-called “foreign affairs differential” in light of globalization); Peter J.
Spiro, Normalizing Foreign Relations Law After Zivotofsky II, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND
22 (2015) (discussing Zivotofsky II as emblematic of the traditional approach to foreign affairs
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Although the existence of such a trend has been questioned and it may not
apply where national security or the recognition of a foreign power is
concerned,23 the legal and historical justifications for foreign affairs
exceptionalism may make less sense in today’s society than at our nation’s
founding. I consider how a possible trend towards judicial normalization
impacts the constitutional susceptibility of state and local climate action
under the Supremacy Clause. I also consider countervailing views of the
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause24 and of the Compact Clause.25
Third, I analyze other ways that cities and states have engaged in
foreign affairs to demonstrate that cross-border subnational climate activities
are not unique. States and local governments have entered into hundreds,
perhaps thousands, of agreements with foreign national and subnational
governments in the last half-century on a wide range of topics.26 In addition,
many subnational governments have engaged in the international human
rights system, which offers comparable insights for the climate context. Set
against this backdrop, the recent climate activities by states and cities do not
seem extraordinary. If the Supreme Court was to determine that certain types of
subnational global climate actions were unconstitutional, then a whole host of
other activities by states and cities would also be called into question. In short,
exceptionalism in which the national government is held to have exclusive rights and powers
over foreign affairs) [hereinafter Spiro, Normalizing Foreign Relations Law].
23
As discussed in Part III.C, the normalization theory is not without criticism. See, e.g.,
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 576 U.S. 1059 (2015); Jack Goldsmith,
Zivotofsky II as Precedent in the Executive Branch, 129 HARV. L. REV. 112 (2015) (arguing
that the normalization trend is not viable given Zivotofsky II); see also Trump v. Hawaii, 138
S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (lifting a preliminary injunction against an executive order restricting
entry by people from several countries into the United States because the government’s
national security justification was sufficient to survive mere rational basis review).
24
See, e.g., GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 176–77 (arguing that judicial review of
state law under the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause should be less exacting than review under
the dormant interstate Commerce Clause); Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, supra note 22,
at 1265 (arguing that the potential for targeted retaliation against subnational actors makes the
“one voice” theory less compelling in the context of the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause).
25
See, e.g., Duncan B. Hollis, The Elusive Foreign Compact Symposium: Return to Missouri
v. Holland: Federalism and International Law, 73 MO. L. REV. 1071 (2008) (examining why
federal scrutiny of international state compacts has been so historically rare) [hereinafter
Hollis, Return to Missouri v. Holland]; Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause,
88 TEX. L. REV. 741, 769 (2010) (arguing that a different standard should apply to crossborder compacts as compared to interstate compacts).
26
Compare EARL H. FRY, THE EXPANDING ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN
U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS 5 (1998) (stating that “state and local governments have entered into
thousands of accords, compacts, and agreements” in the past quarter of a century), with
Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, supra note 25, at 744 (determining from an empirical
analysis of public records between 1955 to 2008 that forty-one U.S. states concluded over
340 agreements with foreign powers).
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this Article is the first comprehensive constitutional evaluation of state and
local action on global climate change, and the first one to consider those foreign
policy efforts in light of broader trends in foreign relations law generally.
The analysis of state and local action on global climate change raises
some constitutional concerns, both for agreements like California’s linked
cap-and-trade program with Quebec and for pledges to uphold the Paris
Agreement. Under the Compact Clause, the presumed constitutionality of
existing agreements between states and foreign governments largely turns on
an assumption: that the interstate doctrine applies to foreign agreements.
Given the Supreme Court’s broad reading of executive power under the
Supremacy Clause and under the dormant foreign affairs power, President
Trump’s repudiation of the Paris Agreement could be interpreted as
preempting all subnational action on global climate change. The dormant
Foreign Commerce Clause could also present challenges for California’s
emissions trading program with Quebec because the Supreme Court has
underscored that the nation must speak with one voice on international
commerce. In fact, these concerns largely form the basis of the Trump
administration’s legal challenge to the agreement between California and
Quebec that links their emissions trading program.27
However, two developments—one legal and one factual—indicate
that subnational action on international climate change would likely survive
constitutional scrutiny. First, the possible trend towards judicial
normalization suggests that state and local action on global climate change
would not be scrutinized more strictly than purely domestic laws and policies,
at least where national security is not directly implicated. Second, cities and
states have engaged in a wide variety of activities that arguably fall within
the grey zone of foreign affairs law, such as conducting trade and investment
missions, entering into agreements to facilitate cross-border legal processes,
and participating in human rights treaty processes. Set against this backdrop,
subnational climate actions do not seem unique. Even the agreement creating
the California-Quebec emissions trading program is arguably similar to other
cross-border activities, such as an agreement between New York and Quebec
on driver’s licenses and an agreement between states and provinces on the
Great Lakes. Through an innovative analysis that situates state and local
climate change agreements within a broader legal and factual context, this
Article posits that cross-border subnational climate action is likely to be
found constitutional.
The organizational structure of this Article is as follows. Part I
provides an overview of the range of agreements that states and cities have
27

Amended Complaint, United States of America v. California, No. 2:19-cv-02142-WBSEFB (E.D. CA. Nov. 19, 2019), ECF No. 7.
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entered into with foreign governments, describes the global climate efforts of
states and cities, and explains why these activities can be described as norm
sustaining of international climate law. In general, I use the phrase “state and
local action on global climate change” or “subnational action on global climate
change” to refer to activity that could possibly implicate foreign affairs.28 Parts
II, III, and IV, respectively, discuss the Compact and Treaty Clauses,
preemption under the Supremacy Clause and the dormant foreign affairs
power, and the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause. In each Part, I examine
key Supreme Court cases and then apply the law to a range of subnational
climate activity. Each Part concludes with a discussion of the scholarly debates
and considers how a potential change in the law would impact the
constitutional susceptibility of state and local action on global climate change.
The Conclusion provides a detailed summary of the entire argument.
I. STATES AND CITIES AS GLOBAL ACTORS
A. Foreign Engagement by States and Cities
Over the last half-century, states and cities have become increasingly
active on the global stage.29 They have entered into a range of agreements on
topics, from those that seem like ordinary contracts to others that seem like
they would be governed by treaties concluded by the federal government.30
Although early agreements largely concerned border disputes, interstate
compacts became more widespread after the New Deal as a way to jointly
address problems.31 States and cities have also concluded agreements with
foreign national and subnational governments on a range of topics, including
trade, tourism, transportation, family issues, sister-state relations, security,
the environment, and agriculture.32 No centralized system exists for reporting
or tracking agreements with foreign national and subnational governments.33
28

Like other scholars writing in this area, I recognize it is difficult to draw precise boundaries
between “domestic” and “foreign” and purposefully adopt a broad definition of foreign
relations. For example, as Sitaraman and Wuerth note:
“[F]oreign” and “domestic” are not so clear anymore. For this reason, we largely
bracket the question of what exactly fits into foreign relations exceptionalism. We
mean to include national security law, foreign affairs law, and immigration law,
though each of these areas is contested as to its scope and [degree] . . .
Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 13, at 1907 n.28.
29
See GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 35–75.
30
Fabien Gelinas, The Constitution of Agreement: A Brief Look at Sub-Federal Cross-Border
Cooperation, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1179, 1189.
31
Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, supra note 25, at 763.
32
Id. at 754.
33
Id. at 750.
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Estimates of the number of such agreements range from the hundreds to the
thousands over the last half-century.34
A variety of factors motivate states and cities to enter into agreements
that arguably implicate foreign affairs.35 They may seek to establish a common
position, create an ongoing relationship, develop a project, or harmonize their
regulations.36 Certain problems, such as transboundary pollution, can only be
effectively addressed through cross-border collaboration. On our northern
border, U.S. states and Canadian provinces have long cooperated on
environmental issues, such as water pollution, acid rain, and other issues.37
Having states be involved on the international stage often inures to the
benefit of the nation. For example, President Eisenhower encouraged the
creation of sister cities to promote cross-border economic and diplomatic ties.38
States and cities often offer tax incentives and land use concessions
to attract foreign business, which gives them the opportunity to influence
international commercial relations. In addition, governors and mayors have
routinely engaged in trade missions to other countries since the first such
mission to Europe by North Carolina’s governor in 1959.39
States and cities may also view international agreements as a way to
fill voids left by the national government or to signal opposition to national
policy.40 With global travel becoming easier and international news readily
available, more Americans want to maintain connections to other countries.
Constituents may put pressure on public officials, including local officials, to
take stands on trade, investment, and other foreign policy issues.41
The sheer size of the populations and economies of some of our states
and metropolises provides added impetus to become involved. For example,
if California was a sovereign state, it would have the fifth largest economy in
34

Compare FRY, supra note 26, at 5 (estimating the number of state agreements in the
“thousands”), with Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, supra note 25, at 744 (estimating
the number of agreements with foreign governments as 340 between1955 and 2008).
35
As noted earlier, the lines between “domestic” and “foreign” are not entirely clear. I
purposefully adopt a broad definition because many topics cross domestic and foreign lines.
36
Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, supra note 25, at 755.
37
GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 60–61.
38
Id. at 285.
39
Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, supra note 25, at 749.
40
GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 46.
41
The increasingly significant role of local and state governments in international relations
is well-documented. See Peter Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM
L. REV. 567, 585–85 (1997) (discussing the normalization of state commitments to international
human rights, and advocating for a doctrine of subnational responsibility); see also GLENNON &
SLOANE, supra note 8, at 41–42, 45 (noting that such advocacy has “led to the establishment of
new state offices and institutions, such as the Secretary of Foreign Affairs in California, the Office
of International Affairs in Hawaii, and the Office of Federal and International Relations in
Kentucky).
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the world.42 The widespread nature of these activities belies a common
understanding of which level of government is responsible for foreign affairs
and under what circumstances.
B. Global Climate Action
Since the 1990s, U.S. states and cities have engaged in global climate
action,43 and these efforts have gained momentum to fill a perceived void in
national policy.44 Climate change is a multi-scalar collective action problem
that demands coordinated solutions at all levels, from the local to the global.45
Given that many states and cities are feeling the direct impacts of climate
change,46 some find it advantageous to engage internationally on climate
change issues.47 This rise has been fostered by the international climate treaty
regime, which has welcomed the participation of state and local governments,
42
Associated Press, California Now Has the World’s 5th Largest Economy, CBS NEWS (May
4, 2018), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/california-now-has-the-worlds-5th-largest-economy
[https://perma.cc/WAX4-R7W].
43
Michele M. Betsill & Harriet Bulkeley, Transnational Networks and Global
Environmental Governance: The Cities for Climate Protection Program, 48 INT’L STUD. Q.
471, 472 (2004); Heike Schroeder & Harriet Bulkeley, Global Cities and the Governance of
Climate Change: What is the Role of Law in Cities?, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 313, 317 (2009).
44
For example, in 2017, Hawaii enacted a law designed to implement the Paris Agreement.
2017 Haw. Sess. Laws 101 (S.B. 559). This is an example of the “downloading” of
international law that Koh describes. See also Cinnamon Carlarne, On Localism and the
Persistent Power of the State, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 285, 285–86 (2018) (noting
state initiatives which pledge support for the goals of the Paris Agreement); Jean Galbraith,
Two Faces of Foreign Affairs Federalism and What They Mean for Climate Change
Mitigation, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 274, 274–75 (2018) (noting support from “various
states, Indian tribes, counties, and cities” to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement); James
Salzman, Introduction to the Symposium on Climate Change Localism, 112 AM. J. INT’L L.
UNBOUND 266, 266–67 (2018) (tallying the number of subnational American entities
pledging to the Paris Agreement as “ten states, nine tribes, and 278 cities and counties”).
45
See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining
the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1159–60 (2008) (discussing
the unique problems that environmentalists face in stopping climate change related to
“enormous interdependencies, uncertainties, circularities, and conflicting shareholders
implicated by any effort to develop a solution”); Hari M. Osofsky, The Complexities of
Multipolar Approaches to Climate Change: Lessons from Litigation and Local Action
Divergent Responses to Climate Change in a Multipolar World, 107 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.
PROC. 73, 73–74 (2013) (suggesting that international treaties and domestic litigation fail to
meet the needs of climate change activism and reform).
46
See, e.g., New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Given New
York City’s particular vulnerability to climate change, the City has been forced to take proactive
steps to protect itself and its residents from the dangers and impacts of global warming.”).
47
See Murthy, supra note 14 (discussing how and why states and cities have pledged to
uphold the Paris Agreement).
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along with other non-state actors.48 The global climate efforts of states and
cities are diverse but can be loosely referred to as transnational networks,
domestic coalitions, or bilateral agreements.49
Transnational climate networks of subnational governments began to
develop in the 1990s. An early example, Cities for Climate Protection, was
formed in 1992 by the International Council for Local Environmental
Initiatives,50 and is now a broader campaign under the auspices of the United
Nations. The C40 network was created in 2006 and now includes ninety-four
of the world’s megacities committed to addressing climate change.51 A more
recent example, discussed in greater detail below, is the Under2 Coalition,
which brings together state, local and regional governments committed to
keeping the Earth’s temperature rise to well below two degrees Celsius, in
line with the goals of international climate law.52
Other coalitions are comprised of solely U.S. actors that seek to
engage with the global community on climate change. For instance, in 2005,
the United States Conference of Mayors adopted a Climate Protection
Agreement.53 In 2014, a new network called “Climate Mayors” was created
to demonstrate local leadership on climate change.54 In the wake of President
Trump’s announcement that he would withdraw the United States from the
Paris Agreement, over 400 U.S. mayors involved with Climate Mayors
pledged to uphold the treaty.55
Several additional coalitions were also created to demonstrate their
opposition to a U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. A bipartisan
group of governors called the U.S. Climate Alliance was founded specifically
to support the goals of the Paris Agreement; it is discussed in greater detail
below.56 Although the validity of the U.S. Climate Alliance has not been
directly challenged in court, the Trump administration describes it in its legal
48
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Paris Agreement arts. 7(2),
11(2), Jan. 29, 2016, 34 U.N.T.S 243.
49
See Messing, supra note 17 (dividing state climate change agreements into four similar
categories: “near-binding arrangements, memoranda of understanding, third-party representation,
and unilateral declarations”).
50
Schroeder & Bulkeley, supra note 43, at 316.
51
About, C40 CITIES, https://www.c40.org/about [https://perma.cc/XT4V-4Y55] (last visited
Aug 23, 2018); Schroeder & Bulkeley, supra note 43, at 317–18.
52
About the Under2 Coalition, UNDER2 COAL., https://www.under2coalition.org/about
[https://perma.cc/9LCD-XRZT] (last visited Aug 23, 2018).
53
Schroeder & Bulkeley, supra note 43, at 317.
54
City Officials: Paris Agreement Adoption Toolkit, CLIMATE MAYORS, http://climatemay
ors.org/get-involved/city-officials/ [https://perma.cc/G4FR-WC2D] (last visited Aug 31, 2017).
55
Paris Climate Agreement, CLIMATE MAYORS, http://climatemayors.org/actions/parisclimate-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/22UK-ZJ6A] (last visited Aug 14, 2019).
56
Alliance Principles, U.S. CLIMATE ALL., https://www.usclimatealliance.org/allianceprinciples [https://perma.cc/83E5-5QAU] (last visited Aug 31, 2017).
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challenge to California’s cap-and-trade program with Quebec to help build
its case against California.57
A broader domestic coalition of states, corporations, non-profits and
organizations known as “We Are Still In” was created “as a promise to world
leaders that Americans would not retreat from the global pact to reduce
emissions and stem the causes of climate change.”58 It includes 3500
representatives from all 50 states, including 287 cities and counties as well as ten
states.59 These domestic networks are supported by a separate initiative known
as America’s Pledge, which is quantifying the climate actions of U.S. non-state
actors in a manner that will facilitate reporting under the Paris Agreement.60
These categories are not necessarily rigid and national coalitions often
participate in transnational networks. For example, the above-mentioned U.S.
Climate Alliance has joined Canada and Mexico to create the North American
Climate Leadership Dialogue.61 Consistent with other networks, the parties have
committed to a series of nonbinding pledges, such as “advancing improvements
in efficiency, electrification and greenhouse gas emission performance of
vehicles through information exchanges and collaboration.”62
U.S. states have also entered into bilateral agreements with national
and subnational leaders of foreign governments. For example, during the
mid-2000s, after the United States refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol,
numerous states signed agreements with the United Kingdom.63 More
recently, California has led the way with fifty-seven agreements on climate
change with sixteen different countries.64 Forty percent of these agreements
57

Amended Complaint ¶ 55, United States of America v. California, No. 2:19-cv-02142WBS-EFB (E.D. CA. Nov. 19, 2019), ECF No. 7.
58
About, WE ARE STILL IN, https://www.wearestillin.com/about [https://perma.cc/4GXXHND7] (last visited Aug 23, 2018).
59
Id.
60
About America’s Pledge, AMERICA’S PLEDGE ON CLIMATE, https://www.americaspledge
onclimate.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/PD9G-5A8C] (last visited Aug 16, 2018).
61
Press Release, U.S. Climate All., North American Climate Leaders Statement (Nov. 13,
2017), https://www.governor.wa.gov/news-media/us-climate-alliance-joins-canada-and-mex
ico-new-north-american-climate-leadership [https://perma.cc/69ZS-3VFM].
62
Press Release, U.S. Climate All., Joint Statement on North American Climate Leadership
(Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.usclimatealliance.org/publications/2018/9/26/joint-statementon-north-american-climate-leadership [https://perma.cc/99RT-M8G5].
63
See, e.g., Press Release, Timothy M. Kaine, Governor of Va., Governor Kaine, United
Kingdom Forge New Agreement to Address Climate Change Issues (Feb. 12, 2009),
https://wayback.archive-it.org/263/20090314121936/http://www.governor.virginia.gov/Media
Relations/NewsReleases/viewRelease-print.cfm?id=876 [https://perma.cc/Y9PN-MPDA] (serving
as an example of one of the states that signed such an agreement with the United Kingdom).
64
See Climate Change Partnerships, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, https://www.climatechange.
ca.gov/climate_action_team/partnerships.html [https://perma.cc/9BVD-TY42] (last visited
Aug 8, 2019).
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are with Chinese government actors, including national ministries, provinces,
and municipalities.65 Interestingly, in its complaint challenging California’s
emissions trading program with Quebec, the Trump administration highlights
the bilateral agreements between California and China as evidence of
California’s efforts to develop a foreign policy that is counter to the President’s
goals; the actual bilateral agreements, however, are not challenged.66
Many of the bilateral agreements with foreign governments take the
form of memoranda of understanding (MOU), joint statements of purpose,
commitments to collaborate, pledges, and other informal declarations. They
might aptly be described as soft law or “best practices” because they usually
declare that they are not binding commitments.67 For example, in 2018
California signed an MOU with the Chinese Ministry of Ecology and
Environment that outlines various areas of cooperation; this MOU is
discussed in greater detail below.68
Not all state climate agreements with foreign nations can be classified
merely as nonbinding MOUs. For example, in 2013, California entered into
an agreement with Quebec to harmonize and link their cap-and-trade
programs (“2013 Cap-and-Trade Agreement”).69 After Ontario expressed
interest in joining the emissions trading program, California, Ontario and
Quebec entered into a new agreement in 2017;70 the prior agreement between

65

Id.; see also Associated Press, China and California Sign Deal to Work on Climate Change
Without Trump, GUARDIAN (June 6, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/
jun/07/china-and-california-sign-deal-to-work-on-climate-change-without-trump [https://perma.cc/
88RA-4YA9] (detailing one of the many climate agreements California has signed with China).
66
Amended Complaint ¶ 54, United States of America v. California, No. 2:19-cv-02142WBS-EFB (E.D. CA. Nov. 19, 2019), ECF No. 7.
67
Kysar & Meyler, supra note 15, at 1637–38.
68
Memorandum of Understanding to Enhance Cooperation on Climate and Environment
Between the Ministry of Ecology and Environment of the People’s Republic of China and
the State of California of the United States art. 1, Cal.-China, Nov. 8, 2018, https://www.
energy.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2019-12/China_MOU-Ministry_of_Ecology_ada.pdf
[https://perma. cc/T7A6-757K] [hereinafter California-China MOU].
69
Agreement Between the California Air Resources Board and the Gouvernement du Québec
Concerning the Harmonization and Integration of Cap-and-Trade Programs for Reducing
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Cal.-Que., Sep. 27, 2013, https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/cc/cap
andtrade/linkage/ca_quebec_linking_agreement_english.pdf [https://perma.cc/9A58-FU97]
[hereinafter 2013 Cap-and-Trade Agreement].
70
Agreement on the Harmonization and Integration of Cap-and-Trade Programs for
Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions between the Gouvernement du Québec, the
Government of California and the Government of Ontario, Sep. 22, 2017,
https://www.ieta.org/resources/News/California/Agreement%20on%20the%20Harmonizati
on%20and%20Integration%20of%20CapTrade-22Sept.pdf [https://perma.cc/32WK-JZ5T]
[hereinafter 2017 Harmonization and Integration Agreement].
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California and Quebec was then terminated.71 However, shortly thereafter,
due to a change in provincial leadership in 2018, Ontario subsequently
withdrew.72 The 2017 Cap-and-Trade Agreement survived the withdrawal of
Ontario and it still governs the relationship between California and Quebec
(hereinafter, “Cap-and-Trade Agreement”). However, on October 23, 2019,
the Trump administration sued California over this cross-border emissions
trading program and the litigation was unfolding as this Article was being
finalized for publication.73
A cap-and-trade program is a market-based form of environmental
regulation.74 It sets a “cap” or limit on greenhouse gas emissions and provides
“emissions allowances” to regulated parties, which gives them the right to
produce a certain amount of emissions.75 The regulated parties are then able
to “trade” their emissions allowances, which enables companies that are able
to achieve emissions reductions at low cost to sell their excess allowances to
entities that face higher compliance costs. The Cap-and-Trade Agreement
links two distinct cap-and-trade programs by creating reciprocal obligations:
California accepts compliance instruments for emissions reductions in
Quebec, and vice-versa, because the two jurisdictions enacted similar laws,

71
Amendment to the Agreement between the California Air Resources Board and the
Gourvernment du Quebec Concerning the Harmonization and Integration of Cap-and-Trade
Programs for Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Cal.-Ont., Oct. 4, 2017, https://ww3.arb.
ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/linkage/2017_amendment_ca-qc_linkage_agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/
B8 N4-KWA9].
72
See Cindy Vaillancourt, Joanna Rosengarten & Selina Lee-Andersen, Love Them and
Leave Them: Taking a Closer Look at the Implications of Ontario’s Announcement to Cancel
Its Cap-and-Trade Program, LEXOLOGY (June 22, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=98845668-cc2f-4da2-a9b7-70149d13583f [https://perma.cc/YA78-KYN4] (discussing the consequences of Ontario’s exit from the 2017 Cap-and-Trade agreement).
73
The United States filed an amended complaint less than one month after filing the initial
complaint. Amended Complaint ¶¶ 1–5, United States of America v. California, No. 2:19cv-02142-WBS-EFB (E.D. CA. Nov. 19, 2019), ECF No. 7. As this Article was being
finalized, the litigation was still ongoing. Just before publication, the Eastern District of
California had issued an order rejecting the summary judgment motion of the United States
on its Treaty Clause and Compact Clause causes of action, United States v. California, No.
2:19-cv-02142 WBS EFB, 2020 WL 1182663 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2020), and another order
rejecting the United States government’s challenge on dormant foreign affairs grounds,
United States v. California, No. 2:19-cv-02142 WBS EFB, 2020 WL 4043034 (E.D. Cal.
July 17, 2020).
74
Cap and Trade Basics, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS, https://www.c2es.org/
content/cap-and-trade-basics/ [https://perma.cc/D3SJ-LQF2] (last visited Sep 7, 2019).
75
See Sloss, supra note 16, at 511 (discussing the economic mechanisms that govern capand-trade agreements).
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regulations and guidance documents.76 This agreement is discussed and
analyzed in greater detail below.
It is perhaps no surprise that this emissions linkage occurred between
California and Quebec—two subnational governments that have been active
globally. California’s expertise in air policy innovation is due in part to the
distinct legal authority that the state has under the Clean Air Act,77 and to the
efforts it has made to fill a void in national climate policy.78 In Canada,
76
Linkage, CAL. AIR RES. BD., https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/ linkage/linkage.htm
[https://perma.cc/59K2-VRN2] (last visited Jan 30, 2019); see also Wright, supra note 16,
at 10,484 (discussing how California and Quebec’s cap-and-trade programs are linked).
77
Section 209 of the Clean Air Act allows the EPA Administrator to waive the general
prohibition against states setting standards for new motor vehicles under certain conditions.
42 U.S.C. § 7543 (2018). In 2013, the Obama Administration granted California’s waiver
pursuant to section 177 of the Clean Air Act. Thirteen states have since adopted California’s
standards. Coral Davenport, Trump to Revoke California’s Authority to Set Stricter Auto
Emissions Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/17/
climate/trump-california-emissions-waiver.html [https://perma.cc/PK5H-V3HF]; see also
Vehicle Emissions California Waivers and Authorizations, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waiversand-authorizations [https://perma.cc/XJ2B-L3K2] (last visited Apr. 19, 2020) (providing the
EPA’s public policy on states’ abilities to set stricter emissions regulations). The Trump
Administration has proposed revoking California’s waiver under the Clean Air Act and
preempting its ability to set stricter greenhouse gas emissions and zero-emission vehicle
standards. Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021–
2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 83 Fed. Reg. 42,986, 42,999 (Aug. 24, 2018); U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE SAFER AFFORDABLE FUEL EFFICIENT (SAFE) VEHICLES
PROPOSED RULE FOR MODEL YEARS 2021–2026 (2019), https:// www.epa.gov/regulationsemissions-vehicles-and-engines/safer-affordable-fuel-efficient-safe-vehicles-proposed
[https://perma.cc/RQV6-8YYM]. These events were unfolding as this Article was being
written and the final rule has been challenged in court. Complaint, California v. Chao, No.
1:19-cv-02826 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2019); see also Greg Dotson, State Authority to Regulate
Mobile Source Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Part I: History and Current Challenge, 49
ENVTL. L. REP. 11,037, 11,037 (2019) (finding that the EPA’s “expansive theory of
preemption . . . poses significant practical problems and logical flaws”); Greg Dotson, State
Authority to Regulate Mobile Source Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Part 2: A Legislative and
Statutory History Assessment, 30 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (reviewing the
statutory and legislative history of greenhouse gas emission regulations); Juliet Eilperin &
Brady Dennis, Trump Administration to Revoke California’s Power to Set Stricter Auto
Emissions Standards, WASH. POST (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/cli
mate-environment/trump-administration-to-revoke-californias-power-to-set-stricter-auto-emis
sions-standards/2019/09/17/79af2ee0-d97b-11e9-a688-303693fb4b0b_story.html [https://
perma.cc/PV3Y-JVGH] (detailing the Trump Administration’s plans to revoke California’s
long-standing right to set its own air pollution standards). In the event such preemption of
California’s authority is upheld in court, this change would certainly impact the way in which
its emissions standards and trading program are structured. However, it does not necessarily
affect the question of whether the Cap-and-Trade Agreement with Quebec is constitutionally
suspect from a foreign affairs perspective.
78
Cullenward, supra note 16, at 3; Carlarne, supra note 44, at 288.
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Quebec is the most vocal proponent of provincial rights and it even claims
the power to enter international agreements.79
Of course, not all states and cities support climate change policies,
domestically or internationally. For example, before it was repealed, twentyfour states had sued to block the Clean Power Plan, which was a key feature
of President Obama’s climate agenda.80 As Jean Galbraith has observed,
these dynamics reflect the “outer face” and “inner face” of federalism.81 The
“outer face” is represented by the direct ways that states and cities engage
internationally, and the “inner face” is illustrated by the ways they interact
with the federal government.82 Nevertheless, the significant subnational
support for the Paris Agreement is noteworthy and merits closer attention.
C. States and Cities as “Norm Sustainers”
Scholars have perceived this rise in state and local engagement on
foreign affairs as part of a broader change in international law. While the
Westphalian model of international law is premised on state consent, scholars
increasingly recognize that it is a legal fiction to conceive of nation-states as
simply unitary actors.83 For example, Koh’s theory of transnational legal process
posits that international law “has evolved into a hybrid body of international and
79
An Act Respecting the Ministère des Relations Internationales, R.S.Q., c. M-25.1.1 (Can.)
(establishing the Minister of International Relations); see also Gelinas, supra note 30, at
1187 (discussing the historical division of national foreign affairs authority between Canada
and Quebec on provincial matters); Wright, supra note 16, at 10,489 (detailing Quebec’s
claims that it has the authority under the Canadian constitution to enter into agreements with
foreign jurisdictions on matters that fall under provincial authority). In other countries, such
as Austria, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, Russia, and Mexico, substate components are able
to enter into treaties, although in most instances, some level of state supervision is required.
See also Duncan B. Hollis, Why State Consent Still Matters - Non-State Actors, Treaties, and
the Changing Sources of International Law, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 137, 148–49 (2005)
(explaining the limited powers of subnational divisions to enter into treaties in these countries).
80
Petition for Review at 2, West Virginia v. Envtl. Prot, Agency, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir.
Oct. 23, 2015).
81
Galbraith, supra note 44, at 274.
82
Id. at 274.
83
See, e.g., DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 112–13 (2010) (stating that “states are not unitary actors”); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER,
A NEW WORLD ORDER 12 (2004) (discussing unitary states versus disaggregated states as
units for analysis in international law); Harold Hongju Koh, The Trump Administration and
International Law, 56 WASHBURN L.J. 413, 415 (2017) (discussing how the transnational
legal process school is premised on the idea that international law is “no longer just for
nation-states or national governments”); Hari M. Osofsky, Multiscalar Governance and
Climate Change: Reflections on the Role of States and Cities at Copenhagen, 25 MD. J. INT’L
L. 64, 76 (2010) (contrasting strict Westphalians and “modified” Westphalians’ approaches
to subnational contributions to international law and treaty-making).
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domestic law developed by a large number of public and private transnational
actors.”84 Scholars have explored international cooperation between
subnational actors, offering a variety of terms to describe these activities, such
as “bottom-up lawmaking,”85 “gubernatorial foreign policy,”86 “transnational
translocalism,”87 “paradiplomacy,”88 and “climate localism.”89
When states and cities pledge to uphold a global treaty, like the Paris
Agreement on climate change, they act as “norm sustainers,” a term I
developed in an earlier article.90 The norm sustaining concept draws on
Harold Koh’s transnational legal process theory,91 and is analogous to the
way in which non-governmental organizations are often described as “norm
entrepreneurs”92 and nations as “norm sponsors.”93 States and cities are not
necessarily doing something “new” nor are they “officially” acting under
international law. Rather, they are sustaining key norms of international
environmental law at the subnational level. In doing so, they can contribute
to the transnational legal process in three key ways.
First, by publicly benchmarking their own progress on the U.S. targets
under the Paris Agreement, subnational norm sustainers can signal to other
nations that a significant portion of the United States is still committed to the
goals of the Paris Agreement. States and cities are not permitted to disclose
their progress on behalf of the United States through the formal Paris
reporting mechanisms. Rather, they are able to report their progress to NonState Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA), a specially created forum for
recording climate change commitments by non-state actors.94 They may also
be able to participate in a “global stocktake” that will take place every five
years.95 Scholars have also pushed for the creation of a more formal structure in
84

Koh, supra note 83, at 415.
Janet Koven Levit, Bottom-Up International Lawmaking: Reflections on the New Haven
School of International Law, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 393, 408–10 (2007); Hari M. Osofsky &
Janet Koven Levit, The Scale of Networks?: Local Climate Change Coalitions, 8 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 409, 429 (2007).
86
Julian G. Ku, Gubernatorial Foreign Policy, 115 YALE L.J. 2380, 2414 (2006).
87
Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal Federalism and Foreign
Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal Internationalism, 57 EMORY L.J. 31, 40 (2007).
88
Joanna Setzer, Testing the Boundaries of Subnational Diplomacy: The International Climate
Action of Local and Regional Governments, 4 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 319, 325 (2015).
89
Salzman, supra note 44; Carlarne, supra note 44.
90
Murthy, supra note 14.
91
Koh, supra note 20, at 206.
92
BODANSKY, supra note 83, at 146, 193.
93
Koh, supra note 14, at 746 n.4.
94
Paris Agreement, supra note 2, ¶¶ 117, 133–34.
95
See Global Stocktake (Referred to in Article 14 of the Paris Agreement), UNITED NATIONS
CLIMATE CHANGE, https://unfccc.int/topics/science/workstreams/global-stocktake-referred85
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order to facilitate the tracking of pledges by subnational governments.96 By
demonstrating that a significant portion of the United States is on track to meet
the original targets under the Paris Agreement, states and cities could encourage
other countries to maintain and even increase the ambition of their own targets.97
Second, when states and cities rebrand their domestic activities in
support of international law, they can sustain and strengthen key norms of
international environmental law that are embedded within the Paris
Agreement. For instance, by connecting their domestic climate actions to the
Paris Agreement, subnational actors reinforce key principles of international
environmental law, such as common but differentiated responsibilities and
respective capabilities.98
Third, as norm sustainers, states and cities can also demonstrate the
feasibility of climate actions, which can serve as models for national policy,
as the literature on cooperative federalism in the United States has long
recognized.99 For example, California developed its cap-and-trade program
with the hope of participating in a future federal program.100
These efforts allow states and cities to act as norm sustainers of the
Paris Agreement,101 but they also potentially raise constitutional concerns—
questions that have been unanswered to date. Given that President Trump has
repudiated the Paris Agreement on climate change, how can states and cities
continue to engage globally on climate change without violating the U.S.
Constitution and the notion that the nation should speak with “one voice”?
Indeed, the very names of these coalitions, such as the U.S. Climate Alliance
and America’s Pledge, suggest that they are attempting to “stand in” for the
U.S. national government.
In the following Parts, I discuss the key questions this subnational
global climate activity raises under the Compact and Treaty Clauses, under
the Supremacy Clause and the dormant foreign affairs power, and under the

to-in-article-14-of-the-paris-agreement [https://perma.cc/N4EQ-NJWE] (last visited Aug.
24, 2018) (describing the Paris Agreement’s command for the Conference of the Parties
serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement to assess compliance with the
Paris Agreement’s goals periodically).
96
Daniel C. Esty & Dena P. Adler, Changing International Law for A Changing Climate.
Symposium on Climate Change Localism, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 279, 281–82 (2018).
97
Murthy, supra note 14, at 12.
98
Id. at 7–8, 37–44.
99
Id. at 8, 45–50.
100
See generally CAL. AIR RES. BD. FOR THE STATE OF CAL., CLIMATE CHANGE PROPOSED
SCOPING PLAN: A FRAMEWORK FOR CHANGE (2008), https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/
document/psp.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6JS-JMLL] [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE PROPOSED
SCOPING PLAN].
101
Murthy, supra note 14, at n.19.
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dormant Foreign Commerce Clause. The in-depth analysis can be briefly
summarized as follows.
In Part II, I argue that if the doctrine that applies to interstate compacts
also applies to cross-border agreements, as most experts believe is the case,
then the kinds of subnational action on global climate change discussed above
would likely survive constitutional scrutiny. While most experts do not find
nonbinding MOUs to be problematic, the California-Quebec Cap-and-Trade
Agreement has been identified as susceptible. However, those earlier
analyses analyzed the 2013 agreement, and not the 2017 one, which is better
positioned to withstand scrutiny. Moreover, as this Article was being
finalized for publication, the Eastern District of California sustained the
constitutionality of the agreement under the Treaty Clause and the Compact
Clause.102 In addition, I suggest that the Cap-and-Trade Agreement is similar
to other cross-border agreements, such as the one between U.S. states and
Canadian provinces on the Great Lakes. Against this comparative backdrop,
it is difficult to see how the Cap-and-Trade Agreement is constitutionally
deficient without calling into question a whole host of other agreements.
Subsequently, in Part III, I posit that neither Congress nor the
President have taken constitutionally sufficient steps to preempt state and
local action on global climate change under the Supremacy Clause. At best, the
President would have to rely on his own powers to conduct foreign affairs, but
this is a very weak argument, especially in the climate context. This argument is
buttressed by the trend towards judicial normalization and by a comparative
analysis of how states and cities engage with international human rights law.
Finally, in Part IV, I suggest that the dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause does not raise serious concerns. Although the Supreme Court has
underscored the need to speak with one voice in international commerce, only
state tax laws creating the risk of multiple taxation have been struck down and
only under particular circumstances. Although it is theoretically possible to
conceive of the California-Quebec Cap-and-Trade Agreement as a tax, it is
actually a market-based form of environmental regulation. As such, this
subnational action on global climate change does not present risks of multiple
taxation that compromise the ability of the nation to speak with one voice.

102

United States v. California, No. 2:19-cv-02142 WBS EFB, 2020 WL 1182663 (E.D. Cal. Mar.
12, 2020).
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II. COMPACT CLAUSE AND TREATY CLAUSE
A. Doctrine: Functional Test
The first question is how can the agreements discussed in the prior
Part survive the Treaty Clause’s prohibition against states entering into a
“Treaty” or “Alliance,”103 and the Compact Clause’s requirement of
Congressional consent for “any Agreement or Compact” that a state enters
into “with a foreign power”?104
Congress has historically provided explicit consent to only a small
fraction of state agreements with foreign nations, which generally concerned
coordinated action between U.S. border states and Canada or Mexico in four
categories: bridges, highways, firefighting and emergency management.105 In
fact, the exact number of agreements between states and foreign governments
is unknown because Congress has not taken any initiative to develop a repository
of all state and local actions that involve a foreign actor.106 Instead, “Congress
has done remarkably little to define or execute its own Compact Clause power,”
instead letting the judiciary and executive branch define the scope.107
Congress has never withheld its consent to a state agreement with a
foreign government on the grounds that it was a prohibited treaty.108
However, in one instance in 1968,109 Congress gave only partial consent to
an agreement on the Great Lakes that had originally been entered into by U.S.

103

U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, cl. 1 (“No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance or
Confederation . . . .”).
104
Id. art. I, §10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the consent of Congress . . . enter into any
Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power.”).
105
Hollis, Return to Missouri v. Holland, supra note 25, at 1076.
106
GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 285.
107
Hollis, Return to Missouri v. Holland, supra note 25, at 1073. However, the Supreme
Court has underscored that Congress is the relevant branch of the federal government with
constitutional authority:
Congress’s approval serves to ‘prevent any compact or agreement
between any two States, which might affect injuriously the interests of
the others.’ . . . It also ensures that the Legislature can “check any
infringement of the rights of the national government.” 3 J. Story,
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1397, p. 272
(1833) (in subsequent editions, § 1403). So, for example, if a proposed
interstate agreement might lead to friction with a foreign country or
injure the interests of another region of our own, Congress may withhold
its approval.
Texas v. New Mexico, 138 S. Ct. 954, 958 (2018).
108
GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 280.
109
Great Lake Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 90-419, 82 Stat. 414 (1968).
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states and Canadian provinces.110 Due to concerns raised by the State
Department,111 Congress withheld consent from provisions allowing Ontario
and Quebec to become members of the compact and from sections that
“purport[ed] to authorize recommendations to, or cooperation with, any
foreign or international governments, political subdivisions, agencies or
bodies.”112 Because Congress clearly had the authority to grant consent to the
entire agreement,113 the State Department’s concerns were not really about
constitutional power, but about turf.114 The “solution to Congress’[s]
dilemma—the desire to consent to the covenant in the face of objections by
the executive branch—was to grant partial consent.”115 This bifurcated
approach informed future negotiations on the Great Lakes, as discussed below
in Part II.B.4.a.
The first opportunity that the Supreme Court had to consider the
Treaty Clause and the Compact Clause arose in 1840 in the context of an
agreement with a foreign state. In Holmes v. Jennison, the Court struck down
an informal extradition arrangement between Vermont’s governor and the
British colony of “Lower Canada,” which is present-day Quebec.116 The
110

COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, INTERSTATE COMPACTS AND AGENCIES 48 (1983) (citing
ratification of the Great Lakes Basin Compact by Illinois, ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 127, § 192.1–
192.4 (1965); Indiana, Laws of 1955, ch. 220 (Ind. 1955) (H.B. 216); Michigan, 1955 Mich.
Pub. Acts 28; Minnesota, 1995 Minn. Laws 28; and Wisconsin, 1995 Wis. Sess. Laws,
ch. 275; see also Jennetten, supra note 17, at 165 (describing national opposition to the full
Great Lakes Basin Compact).
111
The Great Lakes Basin: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 84th Cong. 17–18 (1956).
112
Pub. L. No. 90-419, § 2, 82 Stat. 414, 419 (1968); Great Lake Basin Compact art. IX, §
2, Mar. 12, 1995–Oct. 9, 1963, https://www.glc.org/wp-content/uploads/GLC-GreatLakesBasin-Compact-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7NY-CS2Y].
113
Under existing Compact Clause jurisprudence, discussed below, the 1955 Great Lakes
agreement that was partially approved as a compact in 1968 arguably did not need
congressional approval. Instead, the parties thought it wise to seek congressional consent
because of the Canadian participation. Similar to the facts of U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate
Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 464–65 (1978), the Great Lakes Agreement created a
commission with extensive administrative powers. However, “each State retain[ed] complete
freedom to adopt or reject the rules and regulations of the Commission,” id. at 473, because
the parties only agreed to “consider the action the Commission recommends . . . .” Great
Lake Basin Compact, supra note 112, art. VII. In addition, each state was “free to withdraw
at any time” U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 473, because each state could renounce the agreement
via a legislative act, although such renunciation would not be effective under six months
after notice. Great Lake Basin Compact, supra note 112, art. VIII; see also Jennetten, supra
note 17, at 167 (arguing that Congressional consent was unnecessary for the Great Lakes
agreement).
114
See Jennetten, supra note 17, at 167.
115
Id.
116
Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 578–79 (1840).

58

Journal of Law & Public Affairs

[June 2020

Court found that because the Framers had intended to cut off communications
between states and foreign powers,117 the agreement was invalid under the
Compact Clause unless it was “made under the supervision of the United
States . . . .”118 Justice Taney’s plurality opinion determined that the Vermont
agreement with Canada violated Article 1, §10, at least in substance if not
form.119 However, the Court as a whole did not agree whether the
arrangement triggered clause 1 (the Treaty Clause) or clause 3 (the Compact
Clause) of Article 1, §10.120
In subsequent opinions, the Supreme Court observed that Holmes was
“inconclusive” as to the scope of the Compact Clause and retreated from such
a plain-meaning interpretation of the clause.121 Although the framers of the
Constitution ascribed particular meaning to the terms “treaty,” “agreement,”
and “compact,” the Court acknowledged that these distinctions have been lost
to history.122 The Court looked to the writings of Justice Story:
Treaties, alliances, and confederations . . . generally connote
military and political accords and are forbidden to the States.
Compacts and agreements, on the other hand, embrace “mere
private rights of sovereignty; such as questions of boundary;
interests in land situate in the territory of each other; and other
internal regulations for the mutual comfort and convenience
of States bordering on each other.”123
117

Id. at 568–79.
Id. at 578.
119
See also GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 281 (discussing the plurality’s holding in
Holmes v. Jennison).
120
Holmes, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 580 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (“Nor is there any treaty . . . of
the United States, or any particular part of the Constitution alluded to in the record, with which
the power exercised by the governor is brought in conflict or decided against.”).
121
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 464–65 (1978). But see Hollis,
Unpacking the Compact Clause, supra note 25, at 779–82 (suggesting that the “Supreme
Court might accept different constitutional standards for agreements impacting foreign
relations and interstate arrangements”).
122
See U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 460–64 (describing how Justice Story fashioned his own
definitions in his book of Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States); Virginia
v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519–20 (1893) (suggesting there is no “difference in the
meaning” of compacts or agreements “except that the word ‘compact’ is generally used with
reference to more formal and serious engagements than is usually implied in the term
‘agreement’”); see also GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 281 (discussing the lack of clarity
regarding what constitutes a prohibited foreign state compact); Hollis, Unpacking the Compact
Clause, supra note 25, at 760–62 (providing a history of the interstate compact clause).
123
U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 464 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 264 (Thomas M. Cooley ed., 4th ed. 1873)); see also
Virginia, 148 U.S. at 519 (suggesting that under Justice Story’s logic, the following kinds of
agreements might be of such a “political character” that they should be considered to be
118
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Although the Supreme Court has not defined the precise contours of
the Treaty Clause,124 it has had numerous occasions to consider the Compact
Clause. The Court has rejected a literal interpretation of the Compact Clause,
which would require congressional approval for all interstate agreements.125
Instead, it has reasoned that “not all agreements between States are subject to
the strictures of the Compact Clause.”126
The Supreme Court has adopted a functional test to determine what
agreements need congressional approval:
Looking at the clause in which the terms “compact” or
“agreement” appear, it is evident that the prohibition is directed
to the formation of any combination tending to the increase of
political power in the States, which may encroach upon or
interfere with the just supremacy of the United States.127

treaties within the meaning of Article I: “treaties of alliance for purposes of peace and war, and
treaties of confederation, . . . , and treaties of cession of sovereignty, or conferring internal
political jurisdiction, or external political dependence, or general commercial privileges”).
124
This area of the law may evolve because in its lawsuit against California over its linkage
agreement with Quebec, the Trump administration has raised a Treaty Clause cause of action.
The Eastern District of California sustained the constitutionality of the agreement under the
Treaty Clause, United States v. California, No. 2:19-cv-02142 WBS EFB, 2020 WL
1182663, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2020), but this decision may be appealed. The one
Supreme Court case directly involving the Treaty Clause offers little guidance on its scope.
In a case arising after the U.S. Civil War, the Supreme Court observed that the Confederate
government had “[no] legal existence” because “the Constitution of the United States
prohibits any treaty, alliance, or confederation by one state with another.” Williams v.
Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 182 (1877).
125
U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 459–60. Such a literal interpretation would mean that a whole host of
state agreements with foreign governments, including those on climate, would be unconstitutional.
126
Id. at 469; see also Virginia, 148 U.S. at 518 (identifying several hypothetical agreements
that would not concern the United States, such as an agreement between states to acquire
land for a public building); GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 279 (highlighting many
questions that still remain regarding the scope of the Compact Clause).
127
U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 467–68; Virginia, 148 U.S. at 519. Interestingly, the genesis of this
functional test for the Compact Clause appears to be Justice Story’s description of the Treaty
Clause. U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 465–66. As recounted in U.S. Steel, the Supreme Court of
Georgia “[w]ithout explanation” simply transferred “[Justice] Story’s observation that the
words ‘treaty, alliance, and confederation’ generally were known to apply to treaties of a
political character” to the Compact Clause. Id. at 465–66 (citing Union Branch R.R. Co. v.
E. Tenn. & Ga. R.R. Co., 14 Ga. 327, 339 (1853)). Apparently, this approach “formed the
basis in 1893 for Mr. Justice Field’s interpretation of the Compact Clause in Virginia v.
Tennessee,” id. at 467, even though the Georgia case is not referenced explicitly in Virginia.
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In applying this functional test in a variety of cases, the Court has
never invalidated an interstate compact.128 It has also been willing to find
implied congressional consent.129
The Supreme Court expanded on its functional test in U.S. Steel Corp.
v. Multistate Tax Commission, which upheld an interstate agreement that
created an active administrative body with extensive powers delegated to it
by the States, but that lacked congressional consent.130 The Court found it
important that “each State retain[ed] complete freedom to adopt or reject the
rules and regulations of the Commission” and that each state was “free to
withdraw at any time.”131 In U.S. Steel, the Supreme Court also underscored
that the Compact Clause should be viewed through the prism of federalism:
The Constitution did not purport to exhaust imagination and
resourcefulness in devising fruitful interstate relationships. It
is not to be construed to limit the variety of arrangements
which are possible through the voluntary and cooperative
actions of individual States with a view to increasing harmony
within the federalism created by the Constitution.132
In Northeast Bancorp v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve,
the Court reinforced this standard when it held that reciprocal banking
legislation in two New England states was not “an agreement amounting to a
compact” because “several of the classic indicia of a compact [were]
missing.”133 It applied the “classic indicia” as follows:
No joint organization or body has been established to
regulate regional banking or for any other purpose. Neither
statute is conditioned on action by the other State, and each
State is free to modify or repeal its law unilaterally. Most

128

GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 281.
See Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440–42 (1981) (finding that a federal crime act
constituted advance consent to an agreement between Pennsylvania and New Jersey on
detainers); New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 369–70 (1976) (upholding an interstate
agreement locating an ancient boundary line that did not have explicit congressional
consent); Virginia, 148 U.S. at 525 (finding Congress gave implicit consent to the running
of a boundary between the two States).
130
U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 473.
131
Id.
132
Id. at 470 (quoting New York v. O’Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 6 (1959), a case upholding the
Uniform Law to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Within or Without the State in
Criminal Proceedings, FLA. STAT. §§ 942.01-942.06 (1957), which forty-one states and
Puerto Rico had enacted).
133
Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 175 (1985);
see Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, supra note 25, at 766 (observing that the Court
articulated these four criteria “without citation”).
129
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importantly, neither statute requires a reciprocation of the
regional limitation.134
In applying whether there has been an infringement on the “just
supremacy” of federal law, courts have also examined whether the subject
matter of the agreement has been preempted135 or is wholly within the
historical powers of the states.136 Because I separately address questions of
preemption under the Supremacy Clause and the dormant foreign affairs
doctrine in Part III, I do not discuss these issues here.
The Supreme Court has not ruled on whether the test for interstate
compacts applies to agreements between states and foreign nations.
However, scholars, experts, and some lower courts believe that the Court’s
interstate compact doctrine applies to agreements that states enter into
with foreign governments.137 On the assumption that this view is
134

Bancorp, 472 U.S. at 175; see also Seattle Master Builders Ass’n v. Pac. Nw. Elec., 786
F.2d 1359, 1363 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Even if all these indicia of compacts are present, the only
interstate agreements which fall within the scope of the compact clause are those ‘tending to the
increase of political power in the states, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just
supremacy of the United States.’” (quoting Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440 (1981))).
135
See, e.g., Abrams v. Trans World Airlines, 728 F. Supp. 162, 182–83 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(finding that because Congress had not preempted state regulation of airline advertising,
“coordinated state action poses no threat to federal supremacy and therefore does not violate
the Compact Clause”), dismissed on different grounds, Pan Am. World Airways v. Abrams,
764 F. Supp. 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). But see U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 476–77 (finding that the
facial validity of the Multistate Tax Compact was not implicated by any alleged
contravention of foreign policy). In the ongoing litigation over the constitutionality of the
California-Quebec Cap-and-Trade Agreement, the federal government raises preemptionlike arguments in its motion for summary judgment on the Compact Clause. See Plaintiff
United States of America’s Notice of Motion, Motion for Summary Judgment, and Brief in
Support Thereof at 10, United States v. California, No. 2:19-cv-02142-WBS-EFB (E.D. Cal.
Dec. 11, 2019), ECF No. 12 (arguing that the California-Quebec Cap-and-Trade Agreement
conflicts with existing national law because, “[b]eing ratified by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate, the UNFCCC is law of the land”).
136
See, e.g., Ghana v. Pearce, 159 F.3d 1206, 1208 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that the Interstate
Corrections Compact, which governs the interstate transfer of state prisoners, is “a purely
local concern and there is no federal interest absent some constitutional violation in the
treatment of these prisoners”); McComb v. Wambaugh, 934 F.2d 474, 479 (3d Cir. 1991)
(holding that the Interstate Compact on Placement of Children did not require Congressional
consent because “[it] focuses wholly on adoption and foster care of children—areas of
jurisdiction historically retained by the states”).
137
See, e.g., GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 282 (arguing that the interstate compact
clause applies to international state agreements); Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause,
supra note 25, at 766–67 (noting that “the U.S. Department of State, at least one state court,
the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law, and most scholars have all assumed
that the Court’s interstate compact doctrine does apply” to agreements between states and
foreign governments); Sloss, supra note 16, at 522–24 (noting that while the Supreme Court
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correct,138 in the next Part, I apply the functional test and the classic indicia
of a compact that the Supreme Court has articulated to four different
examples of state and local action on climate change. At the same time,
the following analysis challenges the prevailing view that nonbinding
MOUs present few concerns and considers strong arguments for returning
to a literal interpretation of the Compact Clause in the foreign context.
Nevertheless, I ultimately conclude that the cross-border climate
agreements would survive the interstate compact test. At a pragmatic
level, if these agreements were struck down, a whole host of other
subnational activity would also be called into question.
B. Subnational Climate Analysis
1. Transnational networks: Under2MOU
One of the most prominent transnational networks of subnational
governments is the Under2 Coalition. Each state, local or regional
government participating in the Under2 Coalition signs and endorses a
memorandum of understanding (MOU), which sets forth a number of actions
that the subnational governments “agree to” or “will” do with respect to climate
change action. For example, the Parties “agree to share information and
experience” and they “agree to collaborate” on a wide variety of activities,
including methods for reducing emissions and pollutants, scientific assessments,
communications, promoting adaptation and resilience, and advancing climate
targets. The Parties “will” share best practices and “will” work together. Taken
together, these provisions describe an overarching plan to cooperate, but the
agreement “does not prescribe a specific path” forward because it “recogniz[es]
has not heard a case on foreign state compacts since 1840, there is good reason to think they
would do so under the Compact Clause). In the California-Quebec Cap-and-Trade litigation,
the Eastern District of California also applied the domestic interstate compact clause test to
cross-border agreement and observed the following:
Other courts to consider agreements between foreign governments and
states have applied the tests from Virginia and Northeast Bancorp. See,
e.g., McHenry v. Brady, 163 N.W. 540, 545–47 (N.D. 1917) (finding
drainage agreement between North Dakota and Monitoba [sic] did not
implicate the Compact Clause under Virginia); In re Manuel P., 215 Cal.
App. 3d 48, 66–69 (4th Dist. 1989) (finding program used to return
nonresident minor aliens to Mexico was not an Article I compact
between California and Mexico under Northeast Bancorp and did not
encroach on federal supremacy in violation of Virginia).
United States v. California, No. 2:19-cv-02142 WBS EFB, 2020 WL 1182663, at *11 n.13 (E.D.
Cal. Mar. 12, 2020) (emphasis omitted).
138
If this view is correct, then it could also be understood as illustrating the “normalization”
concept discussed below in Part III.C.

Vol. 5:4]

Constitutionality of State and Local Action on Climate Change

63

that each party has unique challenges and opportunities.” The MOU also
explicitly states that it is “neither a contract nor a treaty.”139
Does the Under2 MOU violate the functional test of the Compact
Clause by increasing the power of the states in a way that interferes with the
just supremacy of the United States? 140 Applied literally, the answer could
be yes because through this type of coordination and collaboration, a state
does become more politically powerful and better positioned to take a stand
on climate change, which may be at odds with that of the national
government. However, the agreement has no legally binding language and
does not purport to give a subnational government any additional power or
authority. In addition, this agreement does not have the “classic indicia of a
compact” because it does not establish a joint organization, does not
condition action by the states on other actors, and does not impose constraints
on laws.141 Rather, the MOU is intended to inspire policy action and does not
impose penalties for non-compliance.
Assuming that the Compact Clause analysis is the same for foreign
cases as in the interstate context and that no affirmative steps have been taken
to prevent or preempt this type of activity, then a transnational agreement like
the Under2 MOU would not violate the Constitution.
2. Domestic coalitions: U.S. Climate Alliance
An interesting example of a domestic coalition created specifically in
opposition to President Trump’s repudiation of the Paris Agreement is the
U.S. Climate Alliance, “a bipartisan coalition of governors committed to
reducing greenhouse gas emissions consistent with the goals of the Paris
Agreement.”142 As of this writing, it includes twenty-four states plus Puerto
Rico.143 In joining the Alliance, the states make several commitments,
including to “[i]mplement policies that advance the goals of the Paris
Agreement, aiming to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 26-28 percent
below 2005 levels by 2025” and to “[t]rack and report progress to the global
community in appropriate settings, including when the world convenes to take
139

GLOBAL CLIMATE LEADERSHIP, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU) ¶ IV.D
(n.d.), https://www.theclimategroup.org/sites/default/files/under2-mou-with-addendum-english-a
4.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KDY-PWF2] (last accessed Apr. 19, 2020). The Under2 Coalition’s
website also explicitly states that, “[a]lthough not legally binding, the Under2 MOU
demonstrates a clear and lasting commitment from signatories to reduce emissions in the
decades to come.” The Under2 MOU, UNDER2, https://www.under2coalition.org/under 2mou [https://perma.cc/PTW5-439M] (last visited June 1, 2020).
140
U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 467–68; Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893).
141
Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 175 (1985).
142
Alliance Principles, supra note 56.
143
Id.
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stock of the Paris Agreement.”144 The states do not formally sign an agreement.
Rather, the Alliance helps to coordinate and publicize their activities.
The U.S. Climate Alliance is clearly seeking to assert a form of
political power that is designed to serve as a counterweight to the national
government’s repudiation of the Paris Agreement. As the earlier discussion
of norm sustaining activities suggests, this type of domestic coalition
potentially enables U.S. states to influence the success of the Paris Agreement
by demonstrating to other nations that a large portion of the country is making
progress towards the original U.S. targets. The very name of this coalition
seems at odds with the clear constitutional prohibition against a state entering
into an “Alliance.”145
However, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would ascribe
particular meaning to the name of the coalition, given that it has
acknowledged that the exact meaning of the terms used in these constitutional
clauses has been lost to history.146 Moreover, despite this potential for
international influence, the power of the U.S. Climate Alliance resonates
more in politics and not in terms of legal authority. Without a joint
organization or binding rules, the U.S. Climate Alliance also does not have
the classic indicia of a compact. Unless there is an affirmative action by
federal government to preempt such action, it is improbable that this activity
would be held to interfere with the just supremacy of the federal government.
3. MOU between California and China
One prominent type of climate cooperation takes the form of bilateral
memoranda of understanding. To illustrate one example, in 2018, California
signed a MOU with the Chinese Ministry of Ecology and Environment that
outlines various areas on which the parties “agree to cooperate.”147 These areas
of cooperation include activities to mitigate carbon emissions, to enhance air
pollution control, to implement market-based instruments, and to increase the
usage of electrified transportation, to name a few.148 The MOU further explains
that cooperation between the parties can take many forms, including sharing
information and experiences, exchange visits, joint organization of seminars, and
other similar activities.149 Through the MOU, the parties further agree to inform
and consult one another on a regular basis and to designate a point for future
144

Id.
U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, cl. 1.
146
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 460–64 (1978); Virginia v.
Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519–20 (1893). See Part II.A for further discussion.
147
California-China MOU, supra note 68, art. 1.
148
Id.
149
Id. art. 2.
145
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coordination.150 The MOU, which lasts for two years, explicitly states that it
“does not constitute or create any legally binding or enforceable rights or
obligations, expressed or implied.”151
Assuming that the interstate compact clause functional test applies to
this agreement with a foreign government, then the analysis of this agreement
between California and the Chinese Ministry is almost identical to the prior
examples. There can be little doubt that California entered into this agreement
as a way to reinforce its subnational leadership on climate change in the
absence of national leadership.152 As former Governor of California Jerry
Brown said after a meeting with President Xi Jinping of China in 2017,
“California’s leading, China’s leading . . . . It’s true I didn’t come to
Washington, I came to Beijing.”153 Such bilateral agreements surely
contribute to California’s role as a norm sustainer of international climate
law. At first glance, it also seems to increase the political power of the state
in a way that arguably could “encroach upon or interfere with the just
supremacy of the United States.”154
However, unless the federal government affirmatively takes steps to
prevent or preempt this activity,155 it is unlikely that this nonbinding
agreement would be interpreted to be an infringement on the “just
supremacy” of federal law.156 The bilateral agreement does not purport to
give California any authority that it cannot already exercise. There is no joint
organization or other classic indicia of a compact.157 As an explicitly
nonbinding agreement, the legal power of California is not enhanced as
compared to the national government.

150

Id. art. 3.
Id. art. 4.
152
See Associated Press, supra note 65 (suggesting that Governor Brown’s decision to go to
Beijing was motivated by a desire to “fill the gap left by the federal [government]”).
153
Orville Schell & David Hochschild, Opinion, How California and China Are
Collaborating to Fight Climate Change, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2018), https://www.latimes.
com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-schell-hochschild-climate-summit-brown-china-20180909-story.
html [https://perma.cc/TR7S-675W].
154
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 467–68 (1978); Virginia v.
Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893).
155
As will be discussed in Part III, state and local action can be preempted by congressional
and/or executive branch action under certain circumstances. As this discussion has already
established, Congress has not exercised its authority under the Compact Clause to regulate
these kinds of cross-border agreements.
156
U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 467–68; Virginia, 148 U.S. at 519.
157
See Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. Of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 175 (1985)
(discussing the criteria which define a compact). See also Part II.A for further discussion
regarding the functional test to determine if a state agreement violates the Compact Clause
or Treaty Clause.
151
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4. Cap-and-trade agreement between California and Quebec
The Cap-and-Trade Agreement between California and Quebec has
been repeatedly identified as the most constitutionally vulnerable of all its
programs.158 However, these prior analyses focused on the original 2013
version of the agreement; the more recent 2017 version is even better
positioned to withstand judicial scrutiny, as I discuss below. In fact, as this
Article was being finalized for publication, the Eastern District of California
affirmed the constitutionality of this agreement under the Compact Clause
and the Treaty Clause.159
As described earlier in Part I.B, regulated entities that are subject to a
greenhouse gas “cap” are able to “trade” their allocated emission allowances.
This type of emissions trading is a form of market-based environmental
regulation that enables compliance at the lowest possible cost.160 The
158

See Cullenward, supra note 16, at 20 (stating that the cap-and-trade agreement is “the
most vulnerable component of the state’s policy portfolio”); Sloss, supra note 16, at 508
(declaring that unlike “[m]ost of the 54 international agreements posted on the California
government website,” the cap-and-trade program “raise[s] significant constitutional issues
under the Compact Clause”); Wright, supra note 16, at 10,491 (arguing that the binding
language in the cap-and-trade program is uniquely problematic for purposes of surviving
judicial review). California’s cap-and-trade program has also survived other legal challenges.
See, e.g., Cal. Chamber of Comm. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Manuf., 216 Cal. Rptr. 3d 694 (Ct. App.
2017), order denying pet. for review, S241948 (Cal. June 28, 2017) (holding that regulations
did not exceed statutory authority); Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. State Air Res. Bd., 206
Cal. App. 1487, 1489 (Ct. App. 2012) (holding that appropriate procedural requirements with
respect to environmental justice concerns were not followed).
159
United States v. California, No. 2:19-cv-02142 WBS EFB, 2020 WL 1182663 (E.D. Cal.
Mar. 12, 2020). The analysis in this Article is largely consistent with the district court’s
opinion. However, given that this Article was already in the final stages of the publication
process, a thorough discussion of the court’s analysis was not possible.
160
Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to address, it is important to note that
emissions trading can raise serious distributive justice concerns. Actions to reduce
greenhouse gases usually have other environmental and health co-benefits. For example,
shutting down a coal plant not only reduces the amount of carbon dioxide in the air. It also
improves the overall air quality. However, a factory located in a minority community may
decide that it is less expensive to purchase emissions allowances than to comply with the
emissions cap. As a result, cap-and-trade programs can exacerbate environmental justice and
equity concerns by exposing low-income and minority communities to disproportionately
greater environmental health risks. See MICHAEL A. MEHLING, GILBERT E. METCALF &
ROBERT N. STAVINS, HARV. PROJECT ON CLIMATE AGREEMENTS, LINKING HETEROGENEOUS
CLIMATE POLICIES (CONSISTENT WITH THE PARIS AGREEMENT) 4 (2017),
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/ default/files/files/publication/mehling-metcalf-stavinsfinal171019-1020.pdf [https://perma. cc/JA79-7JL9] (explaining how emissions trading
minimizes compliance costs for carbon caps); see also Cullenward, supra note 16, at 11.
Internationally, market mechanisms, such as emissions trading, have also faced resistance
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California-Quebec Cap-and-Trade Agreement is premised on the mutual
recognition of reciprocal legislation that was separately enacted in the two
jurisdictions. California’s comprehensive cap-and-trade program is a result
of its 2006 Global Warming Solutions Act, which required that the state
reduce emissions back to 1990 levels by 2020.161 By executive order,
California now requires an eighty percent reduction of greenhouse gases from
1990 levels by 2050.162 The cap-and-trade system creates greenhouse gas
allowances and offset credits, which are given to qualified projects that
remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.163 Quebec has enacted a similar
regulatory program.164
California was able to enter into an agreement with Quebec because
California’s cap-and-trade regulation expressly permits linkage with
emissions trading programs in other jurisdictions.165 Linkage expands the
available market and thereby enables emissions reductions to take place in
the most cost-effective manner.166 Creating a linked market also helps to
prevent leakage by discouraging firms from shifting production to
jurisdictions with fewer restrictions.167 This, in turn, can enhance the political
will needed to address collective active problems and provide opportunities
to share administrative procedures and best practices.168 Thus, the Cap-andbecause they have been perceived as a way for rich countries to buy their way out of making
emissions reductions. BODANSKY, supra note 83, at 152.
161
California Cap on Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Market-based Compliance Mechanisms,
CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 17, §§ 95800-96023 (2020); California Global Warming Solutions Act of
2006, 2006 Cal. Stat. 3419 (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38500 (West 2020)).
See generally CLIMATE CHANGE SCOPING PLAN, supra note 100, at ES-1; CAL. AIR RES. BD.,
FACTS ABOUT THE LINKED CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAMS (2017), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/
capandtrade/linkage/linkage_fact_sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/UF4C-E779] (discussing relevant
emissions targets).
162
CLIMATE CHANGE PROPOSED SCOPING PLAN, supra note 100, at ES-2.
163
See CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 17, § 95820 (2020) (creating greenhouse gas emissions
allowances and allowing the Air Resources Board to issue offset credits).
164
The province of Quebec in Canada also has a legislative requirement to reduce emissions
to twenty percent below 1990 levels. Concernant l’adoption de la cible de réduction des
émissions de gaz à effet de serre du Québec à l’horizon 2020, G.O.Q. 2009, pt. 2, No. 11872009, at 5871(Can.). Quebec then established a cap-and-trade program in 2011. See
generally Environment Quality Act, C.Q.L.R., c. Q-2, r. 46.1 (Can.) (setting “rules for the
operation of the cap-and-trade system”). For more detailed context, see GOV’T OF QUEBEC,
QUEBEC CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEM FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION ALLOWANCES (C&T):
TECHNICAL OVERVIEW (2018), http://www.environnement.gouv.qc.ca/changements/carbone
/documents-spede/technical-overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/FVH7-GBEH].
165
See generally CAL. CODE REGS. Tit. 17, §§ 95800-96023 (2020) (establishing the
California cap-and-trade regulations, including express permission for linkage).
166
MEHLING, METCALF & STAVINS, supra note 160, at 3.
167
CLIMATE CHANGE PROPOSED SCOPING PLAN, supra note 100, at 31.
168
Wright, supra note 16, at 10484.
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Trade Agreement itself does not set emissions standards or regulate
greenhouse gases. Rather, it links two separate regulatory systems, which in
turn facilitates compliance and reduces costs by giving regulated entities
access to a larger market of allowances.
With the goal of linking cap-and-trade programs across several states
and Canadian provinces, California helped to develop a regional greenhouse
gas emissions reduction platform called the Western Climate Initiative
(WCI).169 At the height of interest in 2010, seven U.S. states and four
Canadian provinces were formal partners through WCI, with an additional
fifteen parties in the U.S. and Mexico acting as observers.170 Despite early
interest from many states and provinces, only California and Quebec
successfully developed cap-and-trade programs.171
The California and Quebec cap-and-trade programs were developed
collaboratively in order to facilitate harmonization of processes and
procedures, to enable cross-jurisdictional transfers, and to conduct joint
auctions of emission allowances.172 California began its own in-state
emissions trading program in 2013. Then, after a determination by Governor
Jerry Brown on April 8, 2013, that the Quebec program met the requirements
for linking with the California program,173 the two jurisdictions formally
linked their cap-and-trade programs on January 1, 2014.174 The terms of the
agreement were re-negotiated in 2017, and for a brief period of time, Ontario
was also a party to the agreement.175
The Cap-and-Trade Agreement between California and Quebec
contains many “shall” clauses.176 Most of these clauses relate to procedural
matters, such as requiring the parties to “consult each other regularly and
constructively”177 and to “resolve differences by using and building on
169

See generally Frequently Asked Questions, W. CLIMATE INITIATIVE,
http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/the-wci-cap-and-trade-program/faq [https://perma.cc
/94Y2-NMZH] (last visited Aug 2, 2018) (providing background information on the Western
Climate Initiative); CLIMATE CHANGE PROPOSED SCOPING PLAN, supra note 100, at 30 app. D
(discussing the Western Climate Initiative).
170
Cullenward, supra note 16, at 8–9; CLIMATE CHANGE PROPOSED SCOPING PLAN, supra
note 100, at ES-8.
171
For a brief period of time, the province of Ontario had also linked to the California-Quebec
cap-and-trade system. However, due to a change in provincial leadership in 2018, Ontario
subsequently withdrew. See Vaillancourt, Rosengarten & Lee-Andersen, supra note 72.
172
CAL. AIR RES. BD., supra note 161, at 1–2; Wright, supra note 16, at 10484.
173
CAL. AIR RES. BD., supra note 161, at 1.
174
2013 Cap-and-Trade Agreement, supra note 69; CAL. AIR RES. BD., supra note 161, at 1.
175
2017 Harmonization and Integration Agreement, supra note 70.
176
This was true of both the 2013 and 2017 agreements. See Wright, supra note 16, at
10,490–91 (pointing out that the word “shall” is used over thirty times in the text of the 2013
Cap-and-Trade Agreement).
177
2017 Harmonization and Integration Agreement, supra note 70, art. 3.
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established working relationships.”178 Rather than require specific
substantive changes to either party’s program, the parties have procedural
duties “to examine their respective regulations for the reporting of
greenhouse gas emissions and for the cap-and-trade program in order to
promote continued harmonization and integration of the Parties’
programs.”179 The parties are also required to discuss potential changes and
additions.180 The agreement expressly states that it “does not modify any
existing statutes and regulations.”181
These “shall” clauses have created concern for some scholars. For
example, one observes that “in the U.S. context, where a cross-border
agreement may be treated to more scrutiny than an interstate agreement, it is
hard to see how these would not be seen by a court as binding terms that
impinge government actions in a way tantamount to increasing state power
and potentially interfering with U.S. supremacy.”182 If a stricter standard
applies in the foreign context, then these provisions might be problematic, as
I discuss below in Part II.C. However, if the interstate compact doctrine
applies, then this agreement does not appear to cross the constitutional line.
Despite the number of “shall clauses,” California arguably does
“retain[] complete freedom to adopt or reject the rules and regulations”183
imposed by the agreement. The Cap-and-Trade Agreement expressly states
that it does not limit either party’s “sovereign right and authority to adopt,”
change, or repeal any of its regulations or enabling legislation.184 Rather, the
point of the agreement is to ensure that if changes need to be made, the parties
work together so that each jurisdiction makes the same kinds of modifications
and the regulations remain harmonized. This kind of reciprocal legislation
does not seem so dissimilar from the reciprocal banking legislation
sanctioned in Northeast Bancorp.185 Moreover, the Cap-and-Trade
178

Id. art. 20.
Id. art. 4.
180
Id. arts. 4, 5.
181
Id. art. 14.
182
Wright, supra note 16, at 10,491; see also Welton, supra note 16.
183
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 452, 473 (1978).
184
2017 Harmonization and Integration Agreement, supra note 70, pmbl.
185
Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 175–76 (1985).
In Northeast Bancorp, several states passed “regionally restrictive statutes . . . to allow the
growth of regional multistate bank holding companies which can compete with the
established banking giants in New York, California, Illinois, and Texas.” Id. at 165. For
example, Massachusetts passed a law that
specifically provides that an out-of-state bank holding company with its
principal place of business in one of the other New England States . . . which
is not directly or indirectly controlled by another corporation with its
principal place of business located outside of New England, may establish
179
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Agreement arguably imposes even fewer restrictions on the parties than the
Multistate Tax Compact at issue in U.S. Steel, which the Supreme Court held
did not require congressional consent under the Compact Clause.186
Another important question to consider is whether California “is free
to withdraw at any time.”187 The 2017 Cap-and-Trade Agreement states that
“[a] Party that intends to withdraw from this Agreement shall endeavour to
give 12 months notice of intent to withdraw to the other Parties.”188 Notably,
this provision makes the agreement even more likely to withstand
constitutional scrutiny than the 2013 version of the agreement, which
required that “[a] Party may withdraw from this Agreement by giving 12
months prior written notice to the other Party.”189 Some scholars studying the
2013 Cap-and-Trade Agreement had found this provision to be potentially
problematic because the 12 month notice provision would arguably prevent
a party from withdrawing “at any time.”190 But, if the 2013 Agreement was
interpreted in line with ordinary contract principles, then it would not be hard
to imagine a court implying a reasonableness standard into the “at any time”
phrase. In fact, the withdrawal clause itself explained that such advance
notice is desirable due to the nature of the compliance period within each
jurisdiction.191 Alternatively, a court could have severed that particular
provision and maintained the integrity of the rest of the agreement. However,
given that the newer 2017 Cap-and-Trade Agreement only requires that the
or acquire a Massachusetts-based bank or bank holding company, provided
that the other New England State accords equivalent reciprocal privileges
to Massachusetts banking organizations.
Id. at 164. The Supreme Court upheld the Massachusetts statute, and a similar one in
Connecticut, finding that the arrangement lacked the “classic indicia of a compact.” Id. at
175. See Part II.A for further discussion.
186
The Multistate Tax Compact created a Commission with the authority to study and
recommend changes to state tax laws to promote uniformity. If a state adopted certain
provisions of the Compact into state law, then the Commission’s regulations were not merely
advisory but were binding. U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 457. The Commission’s power included
the authority to conduct audits, and several transnational corporations sued after being
threatened with audits by the Commission. Id. at 458 n.7. In its motion for summary
judgment, the federal government also argued that the California-Quebec Cap-and-Trade
Agreement is a compact requiring congressional approval in part because billions of dollars
are at stake. Plaintiff United States of America’s Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support
of Motion for Summary Judgment ¶ 9, United States v. California, No. 2:19-cv-02142-WBSEFB (E.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2019). This point seems irrelevant; enormous sums of money were
also at stake in U.S. Steel, yet this issue did not factor into the court’s analysis. See U.S. Steel,
434 U.S. at 459–78.
187
U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 473.
188
2017 Harmonization and Integration Agreement, supra note 70, art. 17.
189
2013 Cap-and-Trade Agreement, supra note 69, art. 16.
190
Sloss, supra note 16, at 524.
191
2013 Cap-and-Trade Agreement, supra note 69, art. 16.
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parties “endeavour to give 12 months notice of intent to withdraw,”192 then
California can in fact withdraw “at any time.”193
The Cap-and-Trade Agreement does not create a joint commission,
which is one of the “classic indicia” of a compact, at least in the interstate
context.194 The emissions trading program is administered by Western
Climate Initiative, Inc. (WCI, Inc.), an independent non-profit group that was
created to provide administrative and technical support for the harmonization
of cap-and-trade programs in different states and provinces.195 WCI, Inc. has
developed a compliance tracking system that enables the market of tradeable
allowances to work. 196 California has hired WCI, Inc. as a contractor since
2012.197 This contractor relationship seems markedly different than the kinds
of joint commissions that have been challenged under the Compact Clause.
However, even if the WCI can be characterized as a joint commission, this
factor alone does not mean that the agreement is a compact requiring
congressional consent. In U.S. Steel, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld “a
multilateral agreement creating an active administrative body with extensive
powers delegated to it by the States, but lacking congressional consent.”198
The Cap-and-Trade Agreement between California and Quebec is
unique, but it is not that different from other examples of cross-border
harmonization between the United States and Canada.199 A comparative look
192

2017 Harmonization and Integration Agreement, supra note 70, art. 17.
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 473 (1978).
194
Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 175 (1985).
See Part II.A for further discussion.
195
2013 Cap-and-Trade Agreement, supra note 69, pmbl., art. 11.; SEC’Y OF STATE, STATE OF
DEL., CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION OF WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, INC. §3 (2011),
http://www.wci-inc.org/docs/Certificate_of_Incorporation.pdf [https://perma.cc/5G B9-AYR6].
196
Compliance Instrument Tracking System Service (CITSS) Registration and Guidance, CAL. AIR
RES. BD., http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/markettrackingsystem/markettrackingsystem.htm
(last visited Sept. 20, 2019) [https://perm a.cc/RZ3D-2G56].
197
California has entered into consecutive two-year contracts with WCI, Inc. since 2012. Id.;
STATE OF CAL., STANDARD AGREEMENT BETWEEN CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD
(CARB OR STATE) AND WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, INC. (WCI, INC. OR CONTRACTOR),
AGREEMENT NUMBER 17ISD011 (2018), http://www.wci-inc.org/docs/WCI%20Inc_
California%20Funding%20Agreement_2018-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/82FY-CYF5].
198
U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 471; see also Star Sci., Inc. v. Beales, 278 F.3d 339, 360 (4th Cir.
2002) (determining that the Master Settlement Agreement resolving claims against tobacco
companies did not require congressional consent under the Compact Clause even though it
created an administrative body to determine compliance questions); PTI, Inc. v. Philip Morris
Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1197–98 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (upholding the Master Settlement
Agreement against a Compact Clause challenge brought by tobacco companies).
199
In the ongoing litigation over the Cap-and-Trade Agreement, the Trump Administration
argued in part that the linkage agreement between California and Quebec violates the
Compact Clause because the two jurisdictions do not share a border. Motion for Summary
193
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at cooperation between states and provinces in two different examples—one
involving the Great Lakes and the other involving motor vehicle regulation—
offer some important insights.
a. Analogy: Cross-border cooperation on the Great
Lakes
The Great Lakes offer a useful analogy to the Cap-and-Trade
Agreement. In 2000, Congress adopted amendments to the Water Resources
Development Act of 1986, which encouraged the Great Lakes states to work
with their Canadian counterparts to address water management.200 As a result,
the eight U.S. states and two Canadian provinces bordering the Great Lakes
entered into the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water
Judgment at 12, 20, United States v. California, No. 2:19-cv-02142-WBS-EFB (E.D. Cal.
Oct. 23, 2019). Although the seminal case, Virginia v. Tennessee, involved states that shared
a border, the Supreme Court did not include geographic proximity as a requirement its
functional test under the Compact Clause. 148 U.S. 503, 519–20 (1893). Indeed, the Multistate
Tax Commission includes states from all across the United States. See Member States,
MULTISTATE TAX COMM’N,
http://www.mtc.gov/The-Commission/Member-States
[https://perma.cc/YGF2-WHKZ] (last visited Feb. 7, 2020) (breaking down state affiliations
by “Compact Members,” “Sovereignty Members,” and “Associate & Project Members”).
Indeed, a requirement of geographic contiguity would necessarily mean that a state like
Hawaii could never enter into an agreement with other jurisdictions without first seeking
congressional approval. Courts have also upheld other interstate compacts that did not have
congressional consent but that did include noncontiguous states. See Breest v. Moran, 571 F.
Supp. 343, 345 (D.R.I. 1983) (upholding the New England Interstate Corrections Compact);
Gray v. N.D. Game & Fish Dep’t, 706 N.W.2d 614, 622 (N.D. 2005) (upholding the Interstate
Wildlife Violator Compact).
200
As the statute reads:
It is therefore declared to be the purpose and policy of the Congress in this
section— . . . (2) to encourage the Great Lakes States, in consultation with the
Provinces of Ontario and Quebec, to develop and implement a mechanism that
provides a common conservation standard embodying the principles of water
conservation and resource improvement for making decisions concerning the
withdrawal and use of water from the Great Lakes Basin.
Water Resources Development Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-20(b)(2) (2018). In a related
Senate hearing, Senator Russ Feingold said:
In 1998, Ontario’s issuance of a permit to ship water from Lake Superior to
Asia served as a wake-up call that more was needed to protect the Great
Lakes. Several proposals emerged in Congress and, ultimately in 2000,
Congress directed the Great Lakes states to jointly develop, with the
Canadian provinces, a common conservation standard for making decisions
about the withdrawal and use of water from the Great Lakes Basin.
A Resolution Consenting to and Approving the Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water
Resources Compact: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 2 (2008)
(statement of Sen. Russ Feingold) [hereinafter Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Hearing].

Vol. 5:4]

Constitutionality of State and Local Action on Climate Change

73

Resources Agreement on December 13, 2005 (“Great Lakes Agreement”).
On the same day, the eight U.S. states also entered into Great Lakes-St.
Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, which was formally
approved by Congress in 2008 (“Great Lakes Compact”).201
Congress only consented to the interstate Great Lakes Compact and
not to the cross-border Great Lakes Agreement made between U.S. states and
Canadian provinces.202 Why? This seems odd considering that the Agreement
appears to impose binding obligations by requiring the parties to conform
their water diversion policies to its terms.203 In structuring a domestic
Compact with a cross-border Agreement with nearly identical terms, the parties
clearly sought to avoid the situation that occurred in 1968, where Congress
only gave partial consent to the Great Lakes Basin Compact.204 In 2008,
Congress could have passed a law prohibiting the cross-border Agreement or
withheld consent to the domestic Compact unless the Agreement with the
Canadian provinces was rescinded. Neither of these actions took place.
The argument must be that the Great Lakes Agreement does not
enhance the participating states’ power in a way that encroaches upon or
201

See Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, Pub. L. No. 110342, 122 Stat. 3739 (2008); see also Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Hearing, supra
note 200, at 15 (statement of Cameron Davis, President, All. for the Great Lakes, Chi., Ill.)
(“The Compact represent[ed] the first time in history that all jurisdictions—the states and the
two Canadian provinces through a mirror ‘Agreement’—[would have] ‘rules of the game’
for managing the Great Lakes.”).
202
It could be argued that the Water Resources Development Act created a form of advance
congressional consent, which negated the need for Congress to consent to the Great LakesSt. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement. See Cuyler v. Adams,
449 U.S. 433, 441 (1981) (“Congress may consent to an interstate compact by authorizing
joint state action in advance or by giving expressed or implied approval to an agreement the
States have already joined.”); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 523
(2d ed. 1988) (“Cuyler thus stands for the proposition that, if Congress enacts some kind of
consent legislation, the Court will defer to Congress’ political judgment that the compact is
good for the nation and simply ignore the Multistate Tax Commission test.”). If this is true,
then the Great Lakes analogy seems rather different than the California-Quebec Cap-andTrade Agreement. However, if advance congressional consent was sufficient for the crossborder Agreement, then why would the states have sought explicit congressional consent for
the inter-state Compact? In other words, the Water Resources Development Act was not
interpreted by Congress as creating sufficient consent; otherwise, there would have been no
need for explicit consent to the Compact in 2008. Thus, I believe that the Great Lakes
compact still offers a useful analogy to the California-Quebec agreement.
203
Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement art. 200, Dec.
13, 2005, https://gsgp.org/media/1332/great_lakes-st_lawrence_river_basin_sustainable_water_
resources _agreement.pdf [https://https://perma.cc/G9FM-4KWV] (“The Parties shall adopt and
implement Measures to prohibit New or Increased Diversions [of water from the Great Lakes],
except as provided for in this Agreement.”); Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, supra note
25, at 758 n.69.
204
See Part II.A.
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interferes with federal supremacy because the Great Lakes Compact and the
Great Lakes Agreement have consistent terms.205 In fact, a lack of state power
enhancement has led the Agreement to be described as “nonbinding,”206 even
though it has many of the same characteristics as the Cap-and-Trade
Agreement between California and Quebec. I suggest that both agreements
simply ensure that domestic laws and regulations in the consenting U.S. states
are consistent with those of their consenting Canadian counterparts.
Similarly, the “shall” clauses of the Cap-and-Trade Agreement essentially
ensure that California and Quebec have similar regulations, each of which
apply only in their respective jurisdictions.
The cross-border Great Lakes Agreement created a regional body—
one of the classic indicia of a compact. However, this regional body is only
able to make recommendations to the interstate Council, which theoretically
allows the states the freedom to reject those rules.207 In contrast, the interstate
Great Lakes Compact created a Council to regulate water diversions,208 but
because this compact has congressional approval, the states do not need to
retain the freedom to adopt or reject the rules of the Council.209

205
See Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893) (discussing the prohibition on
interstate agreements that increase state political power and thus “encroach on or interfere
with the just supremacy of the United States”); see also U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax
Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 467–68 (1978) (outlining examples of interstate agreements that do
not interfere with the supremacy of the United States). See Part II.A for further discussion of
the restrictions established by the Compact Clause and the Treaty Clause.
206
As noted in the Senate hearing:
[I]ncluding the Canadian provinces in the Great Lakes Compact could
bring political and legal challenges. In an attempt to meet the goal of stateprovincial cooperation without running afoul of constitutional treaty
limitations, the Council of Great Lakes Governors proposed a companion
nonbinding good faith agreement that includes the provinces of Ontario
and Quebec . . . .
See Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Hearing, supra note 200, at 61, 69 (statement of
Noah D. Hall, Great Lakes Envtl. Law Ctr., Wayne State Univ. Law School).
207
Id. at 70 (“The Regional Body’s authority could be fairly described as procedural rather
than substantive; and its determinations described as advisory rather than final. The Regional
Body’s role includes notice, consultation, and public participation, but stops short of final
decision making.”); see also U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 473 (asserting that “each State retains
complete freedom to adopt or reject the rules and regulations of the commission” in support
of the notion that there is no “delegation of sovereign power to the Commission”).
208
Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, Pub. L. No. 110-342,
122 Stat. 3739, arts. 2–4 (2008).
209
U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 473 (“The test [for compatibility with the Compact Clause] is
whether the Compact enhances state power quoad the National Government.”).
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The cross-border Great Lakes Agreement also permits any party to
withdraw twelve months after giving written notice to the other parties.210
Congress knew about this Agreement because it gave its consent to the
companion Compact.211 This implicitly suggests that a twelve month notice
requirement would not run afoul of the requirement that a state be “free to
withdraw at any time.”212 This further suggests that even the 2013 version of
the Cap-and-Trade Agreement, which also contained a twelve month notice
requirement before withdrawal, would have survived constitutional scrutiny.
In many respects, the Cap-and-Trade Agreement is like the Great Lakes
Agreement. Both are designed to harmonize regulatory systems across an
international border and both provide the authority to withdraw and the
theoretical ability to reject the rules. I use the word theoretical here because,
in each case, the states and provinces have gone to great lengths to create
consistent and reciprocal regulatory systems.
b. Analogy: Cross-border agreement on drivers
licenses and traffic offenses
Another comparable example may be found in a reciprocal agreement
concerning drivers’ licenses and traffic offenses that Quebec and New York
entered into in 1988.213 The goal of the agreement was to facilitate the issuing
of licenses to residents of one jurisdiction from the other jurisdiction and to
streamline the processes for addressing traffic violations.214 For example,
under this agreement, a person with a drivers’ license in Quebec would not

210
Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement, supra
note 203, at art. 707.
211
The congressional record includes references to the Agreement. See Great Lakes–St.
Lawrence River Basin Hearing, supra note 200 (referencing the agreement in the Compact
Senate Hearing).
212
U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 473.
213
Highway Safety Code, C.Q.L.R., c. C-24.2, r. 16 (Can.) (“Regulation respecting the
Reciprocal Agreement between the State of New York and Québec concerning Drivers’
Licences and Traffic Offenses”).
214
Id. at sched. 1. At first glance, the N.Y.-Quebec agreement may seem less analogous
because it involves jurisdictions that border one another. However, as I discuss, supra note
199, geographic proximity is not relevant to the functional test under the Compact Clause.
In fact, a requirement of contiguity would necessarily discriminate against a state like
Hawaii. Moreover, the fact that the N.Y.-Quebec agreement does not involve an
environmental problem only underscores the fact that the California-Quebec Cap-and-Trade
Agreement is not about greenhouse gas regulation but about enhancing market efficiencies
and regulatory compliance.
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need to re-take the drivers’ license exam in New York, and vice-versa. 215
Because the laws of one state/province are sufficient to meet the standards in
the other, an even exchange is possible—which is arguably similar to the
reciprocity in the trading of emission allowances between California and
Quebec under the Cap-and-Trade Agreement.
As the power to issue drivers’ licenses and prosecute traffic violations
already falls within the jurisdiction of the state of New York, it is hard to see
how the Traffic Agreement increases its power at the expense of the national
government. Like the Cap-and-Trade Agreement, the Traffic Agreement has
several “shall” clauses that relate to reciprocal acceptance216 and procedural
matters, such as notification.217 The Traffic Agreement permits either
jurisdiction to withdraw at any time, but the withdrawal is effective ninety
days after receipt of written notice.218 The ninety days period is not long, but
the agreement would still fail a strict interpretation of the “at any time” phrase
unless that language is given a reasonable understanding.
Like the California-Quebec linked cap-and-trade program, the New
York-Quebec drivers’ licenses agreement is an example of a cross-border
agreement involving reciprocal legislation that meets certain standards that
are acceptable to the other jurisdiction. Both agreements seek to improve
administrative efficiencies and promote regulatory compliance. The New
York-Quebec agreement does not concern an environmental issue—a fact
that underscores the widespread nature of these kinds of cross-border
agreements. As the foregoing analysis suggests, in some ways, the global
climate engagement of states and cities is not particularly unique. Even the
most unusual and innovative arrangement—the linkage between California
and Quebec—does not seem functionally different than other forms of
regulatory harmonization between U.S. states and Canadian provinces
achieved through the Great Lakes or U.S.-Quebec drivers’ license
agreement.219 The fact that states have already been engaging in these kinds
215

Id. at sched. 1, arts. 2.1, 2.2. Perhaps because the jurisdictions already had similar
standards, the Drivers’ License Agreement does not discuss the need for harmonization and
conformity of regulation.
216
Highway Safety Code, C.Q.L.R., c. C-24.2, r. 16, art. 3.3 (Que.), http://legisquebec.
gouv.qc.ca/en/pdf/cr/C-24.2,%20R.%2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/LX43-Q73J].
217
Id. art. 3.2.
218
Id. art. 8.
219
The Cap-and-Trade Agreement is also functionally similar to the cross-border
reciprocation that exists in securities laws. The issuers of securities in Canada and the U.S.
who meet certain requirements are able to issue securities in the other jurisdiction under the
Multijurisdictional Disclosure System. Of course, this is a legally imperfect analogy because
securities law is a creature of federal law, so it does not raise the same concerns about state
involvement in foreign affairs. See, e.g., Ruth O. Kuras, Harmonization of Securities
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of activities does not resolve the constitutional questions, but it does provide
important context.
C. A Different Standard for Foreign Agreements?
The foregoing analysis was premised on applying the functional test
developed by the Supreme Court in cases involving interstate compacts,
consistent with most expert and scholarly opinions and lower court
decisions.220 However, this is not a uniform view.
Duncan Hollis argues that agreements between U.S. states and foreign
governments should be treated differently than interstate agreements. He
makes a compelling case that by “looking at the text, history, doctrine,
functional justifications, and structural purposes of [foreign-state
agreements], it becomes clear that foreign agreements warrant entirely different
treatment than that accorded to interstate agreements.”221 He would return to a
literal reading of the compact clause and require congressional consent for all
agreements that states and cities enter into with foreign governments.222
Hollis argues that it is wrong to dismiss agreements with foreign
states as legally meaningless because they do not impose binding
obligations.223 This argument is not without merit. As the discussion of norm
sustaining in Part I.C suggests, states and cities can participate in the
transnational legal process and contribute to the success of a treaty even when

Regulation Standards between Canada and the United States, 81 U. DETROIT MERCY L. REV.
465, 468 n.19 (2004) (discussing the benefits of cross-border reciprocation of securities laws
between the United States and Canada). See generally U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Multijurisdictional Disclosure System, in FINANCIAL REPORTING MANUAL (2013),
https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/cf-manual/topic-16 [https://perma.cc/MP9Z-CMQG] (discussing
the securities disclosure system for cross-border transactions).
220
See United States v. California, No. 2:19-cv-02142-WBS-EFB, 2020 WL 1182663, at *11
n.13 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2020) (citing other district court opinions); GLENNON & SLOANE,
supra note 8, at 282 (discussing the functional test as a matter of whether interstate compacts
“interfere with federal power”); Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, supra note 25, at 766–
67 (discussing the functional test for judicial review of state compacts under the Compact Clause,
as opposed to the literal text of the clause); Sloss, supra note 16, at 522–24 (“The Court has
adhered to this functional interpretation of the Compact Clause ever since [Virginia v.
Tennessee].”).
221
Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, supra note 25, at 769.
222
Id. at 779–83.
223
Id. at 787. As a case in point, Hollis cites to an agreement between Kansas and Cuba,
where Cuba agreed to buy certain agricultural products from Kansas in exchange for
lobbying efforts on behalf of the island nation. Id. at 788.
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engaging in activities that are deemed purely political.224 Moreover, as made
clear by the analysis in the prior Part, a transnational agreement like the
Under2 MOU, a domestic coalition like the U.S. Climate Alliance, and a
nonbinding bilateral MOU can all be said to enhance the power of the states.
Each of these agreements enable states and cities to exert global influence
and to act as norm sustainers of international climate law.
Congressional supervision of agreements between U.S. states and
foreign nations does not necessarily mean preemption. Hollis suggests that
Congress could develop a procedure for approving such agreements en
masse, for example, if they meet certain criteria or if a certain amount of time
elapses without congressional action.225 The practical challenge here is that
Congress has been so rife with political discord that it is hard to fathom the
legislative body developing an appropriate mechanism for such approval.
Unless Congress exercises its authority to regulate such agreements, it is hard
to envision the Supreme Court imposing a different test in the cross-border
context than it applies interstate.
Given that Supreme Court has held that the distinctions between the
terms “treaty,” “agreement,” and “compact” have been lost to history,226 the
Court may be inclined to follow precedent and skirt the issue of what exactly
is the difference between these terms. However, if the Supreme Court was to
either determine that the Cap-and-Trade Agreement is a treaty or adopt a
literal test for foreign agreements under the Compact Clause, a whole host of
agreements that states and cities have entered into with foreign governments
would be constitutionally suspect.
In contrast to Hollis, other scholars studying the Compact Clause
argue that there should not be a presumptive need for Congressional approval
of state agreements with foreign governments.227 Michael Glennon and
Robert Sloane posit that in today’s globalized world, the original purpose of
the Compact Clause—to prevent the diplomatic anarchy that resulted during
the Articles of Confederation—seems less apt.228 Moreover, Congress has the
authority to regulate agreements that states enter into with foreign
governments, if it chooses.229 Whereas under the Case-Zablocki Act,

224
See Part I.B; Murthy, supra note 14, at 2 (“Although U.S. states and cities cannot be
parties to the treaty, their actions as norm sustainers can help to ensure the treaty’s success
and heighten international ambition on climate change.”).
225
Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, supra note 25, at 800–01.
226
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 460–64 (1978).
227
GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 282, 289 n.59.
228
Id. at 284–85.
229
Id. at 278.
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Congress has a reporting mechanism for sole Executive Agreements,230 no
similar repository has been developed for agreements between states and
foreign governments. The onus is on Congress to take the lead.
Nevertheless, if Hollis is correct in asserting that compacts between
U.S. states and foreign governments need congressional approval, then
transnational climate networks, bilateral climate MOUs, and agreements
promoting regulatory harmonization, such as the California-Quebec
emissions trading program, would all fail constitutional scrutiny because
none have received congressional consent. Only a domestic coalition, like the
U.S. Climate Alliance, would survive the functional test applied in interstate
contexts.
The Cap-and-Trade Agreement between California and Quebec is
symbolically important because it was the first such linkage between
subnational governments located in different countries.231 As a practical
matter, however, even if the Cap-and-Trade Agreement was struck down as a
violation of the Compact Clause, a finding that California’s linked program with
Quebec is unconstitutional would perhaps have less impact than at first glance.
Even if the cross-border agreement with Quebec is struck down,
California can continue to operate its cap-and-trade program domestically.
Moreover, although California promotes its cap-and-trade system as a key
feature of its “foreign policy,” the bulk of emissions reductions actually occur
through its regulatory program.232 In addition, there is little probability that
U.S. states will develop other cross-border linked emissions trading
programs. Linkage can theoretically occur between different types of
emissions reduction programs,233 but, in reality, linkage is most likely to
occur between jurisdictions with similar political and economic systems, and
thus, similar carbon markets.234 The most likely candidate for linkage with
California would be other U.S. states, such as those involved with the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative.235 Nevertheless, any linkage scheme,
even an interstate one, helps to create soft linkages between different
programs, which can harmonize carbon prices and enhance market
230

Id. at 285. The Case-Zablocki Act of August 22, 1972 requires consultation with the
Secretary of State before any international agreement may be signed or concluded on behalf
of the United States. 1 U.S.C. § 112b (2018).
231
Wright, supra note 16, at 10483; see also INTERNATIONAL EMISSIONS TRADING
ASSOCIATION, QUEBEC: AN EMISSIONS TRADING CASE STUDY 3 (2015),
https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/79uebec-case-study-may2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/
282V-VKKH].
232
Cullenward, supra note 16, at 22; Michael Wara, California’s Energy and Climate Policy:
A Full Plate, but Perhaps Not a Model Policy, 70 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 26, 28 (2014).
233
MEHLING, METCALF & STAVINS, supra note 160, at 5–6, 8.
234
Cullenward, supra note 16, at 21; Wara, supra note 232, at 32.
235
Cullenward, supra note 16, at 21; Wilson, supra note 16.
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stability.236 This could better enable countries to achieve their targets under
the Paris Agreement, which permits countries to meet their mitigation targets
through carbon trading.237
Another valuable service that California provides is sharing its lessons
learned with other jurisdictions. For instance, the 2018 MOU between
California and the Chinese Ministry of Ecology and the Environment described
above includes “activities to implement carbon emissions trading systems” as
one of the areas in which the parties agree to cooperate.238
In summary, because the functional test applied in the interstate
context would likely be used to analyze a cross-border agreement, the
nonbinding agreements and coalitions on global climate change discussed in
this Article would likely survive constitutional scrutiny.
In the next Part, I consider whether subnational global climate action
could be preempted under the Supremacy Clause or the dormant foreign
affairs power given that President Trump has expressly repudiated the Paris
Agreement and has taken steps to withdraw the United States from the treaty.
III. PREEMPTION
A. Doctrine
Under the Supremacy Clause,239 state law can be preempted by
treaties, congressional-executive agreements, and, in limited situations, by
sole executive agreements or related executive actions.240 Despite
opportunities to do so, neither Congress nor the Executive Branch, however,
have explicitly preempted or purported to preempt the transnational
networks, domestic coalitions, or bilateral agreements that were discussed
236

MEHLING, METCALF & STAVINS, supra note 160, at 5.
Paris Agreement, supra note 2, art. 6.2. See generally Andrei Marcu, Governance of
Carbon Markets Under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, in THE PARIS AGREEMENT AND
BEYOND: INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY POST-2020, at 47 (Robert N. Stavins &
Robert C. Stowe eds., 2016) (discussing Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, which allows for
carbon trading); BENITO MULLER, ARTICLE 6: MARKET APPROACHES UNDER THE PARIS
AGREEMENT (2018) (analyzing the genesis and function of Article 6); Mehling, Metcalf, &
Stavins, supra note 160 (discussing facilitation of linkages in Article 6).
238
California-China MOU, supra note 68, art. 1.
239
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”).
240
Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 416–17 (2003); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372, 381 (2000); see also GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8,
at 132, 315–16.
237
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earlier. When Congress was considering climate change legislation around
2010, industry advocated for preemption to ensure national uniformity and
avoid a patchwork of regulation across the states.241 However, Congress did
not ultimately enact any kind of national climate legislation, preemptive or
otherwise.242 Even California’s cap-and-trade program with Quebec has not
been explicitly preempted by congressional or executive action.243 The
Obama-era Clean Power Plan, which required states to take action to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, had expressly permitted emissions trading
between states.244 Under the Trump administration, the EPA repealed the
Clean Power Plan and issued the Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) rule, which
does not expressly permit states to engage in emissions trading.245 Although
the EPA reported to the media that states are still permitted to adopt these
strategies voluntarily on their own,246 the Trump administration has since
sued California over its Cap-and-Trade Agreement with Quebec.
When President Trump announced his intention to withdraw the
United States from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, he did not make
any reference to state and local policies on climate change.247 Is it possible
241

William W. Buzbee, Federalism Hedging, Entrenchment, and the Climate Challenge,
2017 WIS. L. REV. 1037, 1067–70 (2017).
242
Id. at 1097, 1099.
243
See Wright, supra note 16, at 10,491.
244
Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 40 C.F.R. pt. 60 (2018), repealed by Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse
Gas Emissions From Existing Electric Utility Generating Units, 40 C.F.R. pt. 60 (2019); see
also Sloss, supra note 16, at 509 (discussing the Trump Administration’s recent steps to end
the Clean Power Plan); Wright, supra note 16, at 10,491–92 (discussing the Obama-era
Clean Power Plan and its allowance of state-based emissions trading).
245
Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions
from Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guidelines
Implementing Regulations, 40 C.F.R. pt. 60 (2019). This rule has since been challenged in
and out of court by a number of states and cities. Petition for Review, New York v. EPA,
No. 19-1165 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 13, 2019); Att’y Gen. of N.Y. et al., Comments on the
Environmental Protection Agency’s Proposed Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas
Emissions from Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guideline
Implementing Regulations; Revisions to New Source Review Program 1 (Oct. 31, 2018),
https://www.marylandattorneygeneral.gov/News%20Documents/110118_cpp_replacement
_comments.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5DV-UNKN]; Press Release, Letitia James, N.Y. Att’y
Gen., Attorney General James Leads Fight Against Trump’s Dirty Power Rule (Aug. 13,
2019) (on file with New York State Attorney General).
246
Niina H. Farah, Jean Chemnick & Nick Sobczyk, Wheeler Rolls out Carbon Rule, Girds
for Lawsuits, E&E NEWS, https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060632821 [https://perma.cc/
GZ89-YZWV] (last visited Jul 26, 2019).
247
President Donald Trump, Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord in
the White House Rose Garden (June 1, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord/ [https://https://perma.cc/78TJGAWZ].
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that Trump could officially withdraw the United States from the Paris
Agreement but still intend to leave intact state-level policies? It would seem
plausible that if the elected representatives of a state decided to invest in
renewable energy as an economic growth opportunity, then President Trump
would not necessarily be inclined to oppose such action. However, the recent
litigation over the Cap-and-Trade Agreement suggests otherwise.
1. Implied preemption
Where neither Congress nor the Executive Branch has clearly
preempted state and local agreements on global climate change, the question
turns on whether there is implied preemption. In the domestic context, there
is a presumption against the preemption of historic state powers, unless
Congress has explicitly spoken.248 In contrast, in the foreign affairs context,
the presumption goes in the other direction, and it is assumed that Congress
intended to preempt potentially conflicting state law.249
Implied preemption involves two sub-doctrines: field preemption and
conflict preemption.250 Field preemption may be found when Congress
intends federal law “to occupy the field,”251 by making “a scheme of federal
regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left
no room . . . to supplement it . . . .”252 Even if the field has not been occupied
248
See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (“[B]ecause the States are
independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that Congress does
not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action.”); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (explaining “Congress legislated here in a field which the States have
traditionally occupied. So we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the
States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress”).
249
United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000) (“The state laws now in question bear
upon national and international maritime commerce, and in this area there is no beginning
assumption that concurrent regulation by the State is a valid exercise of its police powers.”);
see also GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 294 (stating that the Supreme Court
sometimes reverses the presumption against preemption); Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note
13, at 1928 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), as an example of when the
Supreme Court has reversed the presumption against preemption in the foreign affairs
context); Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, supra note 22, at 674,
686–97 (discussing a number of presumptions which the Supreme Court upends in the
foreign affairs context).
250
The boundaries between field and conflict preemption are not always clear, and field
preemption is sometimes recognized as a form of conflict preemption. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 n.6 (2000).
251
Id. at 372.
252
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190,
203–04 (1983); see also GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 293 (discussing field
preemption as a kind of conflict preemption).
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by Congress, state laws are preempted if there is a clear conflict with a federal
policy.253 Such conflicts can manifest where it is impossible to comply with
both state and federal law, or, where the state law impedes Congress’s entire
purpose and objectives.254 In the foreign affairs context, courts have typically
applied the standard for conflict preemption.255
a. Preemption by statute
To understand whether conflict preemption could exist, it is
instructive to consider the “quintessential example”256 of foreign-affairs
preemption, Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council.257 In Crosby, the
Supreme Court struck down a Massachusetts law that prevented state entities
from procuring goods or services from anyone “doing business” with the
government of Myanmar.258 The Court found the Massachusetts law to be
“an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress’s full objectives”259 under a
federal statute, which imposed sanctions against Burma, authorized the
President to impose additional sanctions under certain conditions, and
directed the President to develop a comprehensive strategy to improve the
human rights situation in the country.260 As a result, the President’s power
was at a maximum because his authority “include[d] all that he possesse[d]
in his own right plus all that Congress [could] delegate.”261 Relying on the
bargaining chip theory, the Court found that the President’s ability to engage
in diplomatic negotiations was compromised by the state law and that the
state law threatened the President’s ability to speak with “one voice” in
dealing with other governments.262
b. Preemption by executive action
Even where executive action has not been expressly supported by
congressional statute, the Supreme Court has found that executive
agreements entered into by the President also have the ability to preempt state

253

Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 421 (2003).
Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 372–73.
255
Id.
256
GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 299.
257
Crosby, 530 U.S. at 363.
258
Id. at 366–68.
259
Id. at 373.
260
Id. at 368–69.
261
Id. at 375 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)).
262
Id. at 377, 381.
254
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law.263 During the twentieth century, the Supreme Court was most inclined
to find preemption in “claims-settlement cases involv[ing] a narrow set of
circumstances: the making of executive agreements to settle civil claims
between American citizens and foreign governments or foreign nationals.”264
In Dames & Moore v. Regan, for example, the executive agreement clearly
extinguished the underlying state claims, and the source of executive power
was supported by implicit congressional authorization,265 as well as history
and practice.266 The Supreme Court has since broadly interpreted executive
power to allow for a finding of conflict preemption even where an executive
agreement does not directly preempt state law and where Congress has not
spoken on the issue.267 In American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi, the Court
struck down a California law designed to help Holocaust victims recover
from insurance companies268 on the grounds that the state law threatened the
national government’s efforts to resolve such claims.269 Expressing “concern
for uniformity in this country’s dealings with foreign nations,”270 the Court
found that the California law conflicted with “the very capacity of the
President to speak for the Nation with one voice in dealing with other
governments to resolve claims against European companies arising out of
World War II.”271 The Court found that California’s law deprived the
President of the flexibility he needed “in wielding ‘the coercive power of the
national economy’ as a tool of diplomacy,” and as a result, gave the President
“less economic and diplomatic leverage.”272 With colorful language, the

263

Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at
610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
264
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 531 (2008); see, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S.
654, 678 (1981) (upholding an executive agreement made after the Iran hostage crisis, which
had the effect of extinguishing claims pending in state and federal courts on the basis of
longstanding custom and congressional acquiescence); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203
(1942) (finding an executive agreement fell within the scope of the president’s plenary power to
recognize foreign nations under the power to receive ambassadors expressly set forth in the
Constitution); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 327 (1937) (requiring New York to
recognize legal claims of the Soviet Union, the validity of which turned on an executive
agreement that President Roosevelt had entered into with the new country in 1933).
265
Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 680.
266
Id. at 686.
267
Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 427, 429.
268
California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act of 1999 required any insurer doing
business in the state to reveal information about all policies sold between 1920 and 1945 in
Europe by the company itself or any “related” to it. Id. at 401, 409–10.
269
Id. at 411.
270
Id. at 413 (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964)).
271
Id. at 416–17, 424 (internal citations omitted).
272
Id. at 424 (internal citations omitted).
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Court observed that “California seeks to use an iron fist where the President
has consistently chosen kid gloves.”273
2. Dormant foreign affairs preemption
Garamendi, however, was not a straightforward preemption case
because the executive agreements in question did not preempt the kind of
disclosure of information mandated by the California law.274 To support its
analysis, the Court turned to the dormant foreign affairs doctrine275 and
reinvigorated a much-criticized doctrine with Cold War era roots.276 The
Garamendi court relied on Zschernig v. Miller,277 and held that “state action
with more than incidental effect on foreign affairs is preempted, even absent
any affirmative federal activity in the subject area of the state law, and hence
without any showing of conflict.”278 Zschernig involved an anti-Communist
Oregon probate statute designed to prevent nonresident aliens from inheriting
property unless they could show that their home country would not confiscate
the property and that American citizens would enjoy reciprocal inheritance
rights.279 The facts were unusual for a preemption analysis; not only did the
case involve an area of traditional state competence, but the U.S. government
represented to the Court that the statute did not interfere with its ability to
conduct foreign relations.280 Nevertheless, the Court determined that
Oregon’s statute intruded “into the field of foreign affairs which the
Constitution entrusts to the President and the Congress.”281
The expansive interpretation of executive power in Garamendi and
its resurgence of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, however, has been
cabined by Medellin v. Texas.282 In that case, the Supreme Court held that a
judgment from the International Court of Justice was not directly enforceable
273
Id. at 427; see also Merrill, supra note 15, at 324 (discussing the “bargaining chip theory”
the Supreme Court endorsed in Garamendi and Zschernig).
274
Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 416–17. The executive branch simply agreed “to file precatory
statements advising courts that dismissing Holocaust-era claims accords with American
foreign policy,” but these statements had no legally binding effect. Id. at 440–41 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting); GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 127, 132–33.
275
Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 418.
276
See, e.g., GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 85, 90, 103–13, 124–25 (discussing the
history of the Dormant Foreign Affairs doctrine); Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism,
supra note 22, at 1241 (describing the backdrop of the Cold War in the development of the
Dormant Foreign Affairs doctrine).
277
Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 417 (citing Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968)).
278
Id. at 418.
279
Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 430–31.
280
Id. at 434.
281
Id. at 432.
282
552 U.S. 491 (2008).
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law in the United States because it did not stem from a self-executing
treaty.283 As a result, the President did not have the power to issue a directive
overturning a state court decision denying a habeas corpus petition.284 The
Medellin decision returned to the framework in Justice Jackson’s concurring
opinion from Youngstown Steel, where he discussed the President’s authority
to act as deriving either from the text of the Constitution or Congress.285
Compared to the assertions of executive power in Garamendi or Dames &
Moore, the claim to presidential authority in Medellin was more modest and
derived directly from an Article II treaty.286 Thus, Medellin suggests that
Garamendi should be read narrowly and that presidential actions alone
cannot preempt state law.287
The continuing validity of the doctrine of dormant foreign affairs has
been critiqued and debated by scholars.288 For example, Glennon and Sloane
argue that the doctrine of dormant foreign affairs should be abandoned except
in the most exigent and unforeseeable circumstances.289 Because the federal
government has the constitutional authority to affirmatively preempt state
law under the Supremacy Clause, it will step in if there is an egregious
case.290 Relying on judges to overturn state laws on the basis of dormant
foreign affairs preemption places too much responsibility on the judicial
branch.291 Nevertheless, some lower courts have continued to apply the
doctrine of dormant foreign affairs preemption.292

283

Id. at 523–30.
Id. at 504–06.
285
Id. at 524 (“The President’s authority to act, as with the exercise of any governmental
power, ‘must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.’” (citing
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952))).
286
Id. at 523 n.13; Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 13, at 1930.
287
See Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity Determinations in U.S. Courts: The Case
Against the State Department, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 915, 929–30, 936–38 (2010) (arguing
that Garamendi should be read more narrowly after Medellin and, more broadly, that “the
displacement of state law at the hands of the federal executive” is in tension with the text
of the Supremacy Clause, “principles of federalism,” and the “core structural attributes of
the Constitution”).
288
GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 85, 90, 103–113, 124–125; Spiro, Foreign
Relations Federalism, supra note 22, at 1241.
289
GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 129.
290
Id. at 136–44.
291
Id. at 175.
292
See, e.g., Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, 670 F.3d 1067, 1072, 1075 (9th Cir.
2012) (applying the dormant foreign affairs doctrine to find California Code of Civil
Procedure section 354.4 preempted).
284
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B. Subnational Climate Analysis on Conflict and Dormant Preemption
This Part applies the foregoing preemption doctrines raised in foreign
affairs contexts to the kinds of globally-oriented state and local climate action
discussed earlier. State and local climate policies have also faced a number
of domestic preemption challenges, but it is beyond the scope of this Article
to address these issues.293 Thus, when discussing subnational global climate
action, I intend to refer to the kind of transnational networks, bilateral
agreements, and domestic coalitions described in Part I.
1. Field preemption
When state and local action on global climate change is examined
from the perspective of field preemption, it seems unlikely that these actions
would be struck down on this basis. Because many federal environmental
statutes are explicitly premised on a cooperative federalism model,294
293

A large body of scholarship examines constitutional challenges to state and local climate
policy and questions of preemption. See, e.g., Michael Burger, It’s Not Easy Being Green:
Local Initiatives, Preemption Problems, and the Market Participant Exception, 78 U.
CINCINNATI L. REV. 835 (2009) (discussing the market participant exception as an
opportunity to protect state environmental law from federal preemption); Kirsten H. Engel,
Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States: A Regional Approach, 14 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 54 (2005) (arguing in favor of regional climate initiatives); Steven Ferrey, State
Refusal Triggers Constitutional Crisis: Past Is Prologue on Energy and Infrastructure, 34
REV. LITIG. 423 (2015) (detailing significant legal challenges to state sustainable energy
policies); Lisa Heinzerling, Climate, Preemption, and the Executive Branches, 50 ARIZ. L.
REV. 925 (2008) (arguing that Chevron principles caution against aggressive preemption of
state environmental laws); Felix Mormann, Constitutional Challenges and Regulatory
Opportunities for State Climate Policy Innovation, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 189 (2017)
(exploring “constitutional limits and regulatory openings for innovative state policies to
mitigate climate change”); Michael S. Smith, Murky Precedent Meets Hazy Air: The
Compact Clause and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
387 (2007) (suggesting that the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, in its current form,
should pass judicial review); Juliet Howland, Comment, Not All Carbon Credits are Created
Equal: The Constitutional and the Cost of Regional Cap-and-Trade Market Linkage, 27
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 413 (2009) (discussing the future consequences of a possible
federal cap-and-trade system on regional cap-and-trade markets); Note, The Compact Clause
and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, supra note 17 (arguing in part that the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative does not implicate federal preemption).
294
See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7431 (2018) (stating in §7401(c) that “[a]
primary goal of this chapter is to encourage or otherwise promote reasonable Federal, State,
and local governmental actions . . . for pollution prevention”); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251–1387 (2018) (stating in §1251(b) that “[i]t is the policy of the Congress to recognize,
preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and
eliminate pollution”); see also ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN CONTEXT:
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Congress arguably never intended to occupy the entire field of climate change
law. For example, the Clean Air Act specifically gives each state
responsibility for meeting National Ambient Air Quality Standards and for
developing State Implementation Plans.295 The Clean Air Act also expressly
preserves the authority of states to implement stricter air pollution standards,
with certain exceptions for the regulation of moving sources.296 Both the nowrepealed Clean Power Plan and the Affordable Clean Energy rule purport to give
states great discretion in meeting their compliance obligations. At the same time,
it has been suggested that the Clean Air Act is really not that “cooperative”
because states do not exercise much discretion in meeting national targets and
face potential penalties for non-compliance.297 Nevertheless, the fact that states
play a role in implementation of federal statutes suggests that the field of
environmental law has not been completely preempted by Congress.
States have also traditionally exercised concurrent power over certain
kinds of environmental regulation.298 For example, many features of climate
policy, such as zoning, land use, and public transportation decisions, fall within
the ambit of state and local authority.299 Katrina Wyman and Danielle SpiegelFeld have also demonstrated how cities, which played an important role in
environmental protection in the 1800s and 1900s, are now re-emerging as key

CASES AND MATERIALS 12 (4th edition ed. 2016) (stating that most federal environmental
laws encourage state regulation in this area).
295
42 U.S.C. § 7407 (2018) (mandating that states develop plans to achieve national air
quality standards).
296
Id. at § 7416. Even the preemption of certain state regulation, however, has exceptions.
For example, § 209 of the Clean Air Act specifically allows California to be granted a waiver
by the EPA to set its own standards for the control of emissions from new motor vehicles
provided that certain requirements are met. Id. at § 7543(b). Although the Trump
Administration has sought to revoke California’s existing waiver, the grounds for doing so
are contested and legal challenges are being filed.
297
See Jonathan H. Adler & Nathaniel Stewart, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?:
Coercion, Cooperative Federalism and Conditional Spending After NFIB v. Sebelius, 43
ECOL. L.Q. 671, 673 (2016) (discussing how states have “chafed” under the CAA and
arguing that non-compliance sanctions, such as the withholding of highway funds, may result
in unconstitutional coercion).
298
See Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097,
1099–1101 (2009) (discussing the history of state-federal collaboration on environmental
regulation); Kysar & Meyler, supra note 15, at 1639 (noting that “the U.S. Supreme Court
has acknowledged [that] states have traditionally exercised substantial powers with regard to
various kinds of environmental regulation—a history of state activity that Congress has
repeatedly condoned”).
299
See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (plurality opinion) (speaking
of the “[r]egulation of land use” as “a quintessential state and local power” and an “area of
traditional state authority”).

Vol. 5:4]

Constitutionality of State and Local Action on Climate Change

89

actors in environmental lawmaking.300 In addition, when Congress was
considering climate change legislation around 2010, industry advocated for
preemption to ensure national uniformity and avoid a patchwork of regulation
across the states.301 However, Congress did not ultimately enact any kind of
national climate legislation, preemptive or otherwise.302 Thus, it is hard to see how
Congress intended to occupy the entire field of law relevant to climate change.
2. Conflict preemption
The kinds of state and local action on global climate change discussed
earlier—transnational networks, domestic coalitions, and bilateral
agreements—do not appear to impede Congress’ entire purpose and
objectives.303 Despite the failure to enact comprehensive climate legislation,
Congress has enacted other laws that would support efforts to tackle climate
change, and thus be broadly consistent with state and local action on global
climate change. As Massachusetts v. EPA makes clear, the Clean Air Act
authorizes the federal government to regulate emissions of carbon dioxide
and other greenhouse gases because they qualify as “air pollutant[s]” within
the plain meaning of the statute.304 As noted previously, the Clean Air Act
also expressly permits states to implement more stringent air pollution
standards, with certain exceptions for the regulation of moving sources.305 In
addition, Congress took steps to address climate change in 1978 when it
enacted the National Climate Program Act and again in 1987, when it enacted
the Global Climate Protection Act. 306
The U.S. Senate also provided the necessary consent for the United
States to ratify the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), which entered into force in 1994.307 Under the
300
See generally Katrina Wyman & Danielle Spiegel-Feld, The Urban Environmental
Renaissance, 108 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (detailing historic and more recent
revivals in city based environmental reform).
301
Buzbee, supra note 241, at 1067–70.
302
Id. at 1097 (noting that, had climate legislation been passed with a preemptive “federal
only” structure, President Trump and his allies in Congress could have precluded all of the
existing state efforts without any additional action).
303
See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372–73 (2000) (“We will find
preemption where . . . . ‘under the circumstances of [a] particular case, [the challenged state
law] stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.’” (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941))).
304
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528–29 (2007).
305
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2018).
306
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 507–08.
307
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, agreed on May. 9, 1992, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
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international legal doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, the United States must
perform its treaty obligations in good faith.308 Among other obligations, the
United States committed to “adopt[ing] national policies and tak[ing]
corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting its
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing
its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs.”309 In light of these obligations, it is
hard to see how state and local actions on climate change are inconsistent
with national policy. In fact, in rejecting a foreign affairs challenge to statebased regulation of greenhouse gases from motor vehicles, a U.S. District
Court held that “state and local efforts in concert with federal programs
contribute to the UNFCCC’s ultimate objective.”310
The United States never became a party to the Kyoto Protocol.311
President Bill Clinton did not send the Kyoto Protocol to the U.S. Senate for
advice and consent to ratification after the legislative body made clear in the
Byrd-Hagel resolution that it would not give its approval.312 However, these
308

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331. Although the United States signed the Vienna Convention in 1970, it
never ratified the treaty. Status of Ratification of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.
aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII-1&chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en
[https://perma.cc/2YHH-FHES] (last visited Mar. 30, 2020). However, the doctrine of pacta
sunt servanda is considered to be part of customary international law. See generally Anthony
Aust, Pacta Sunt Servanda, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIAS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2007) (explaining the customary international law doctrine of pacta
sunt servanda).
309
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 307, art. 4(2).
310
Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 394–
95 (D. Vt. 2007).
311
The United States signed the Kyoto Protocol on November 12, 1998, but never became a party
to the treaty. Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-a&chapter=27&clang=_en
[https://perma.cc/G98M-JFZR] (last visited Sept. 7, 2019).
312
Byrd-Hagel Resolution, S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997). It states in part:
That it is the sense of the Senate that—
(1) the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol to, or other
agreement regarding, the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change of 1992, at negotiations in Kyoto in December 1997, or
thereafter, which would—
(A) mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas
emissions for the Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other agreement
also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce
greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within the
same compliance period, or
(B) would result in serious harm to the economy of the United States . . . .
Id.
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facts should not be interpreted as a rejection of U.S. participation in the
international climate system. As the Byrd-Hagel resolution indicates, the U.S.
Senate did not oppose action on global climate change; rather, it did not want
the United States to face binding greenhouse gas emission limitations unless
developing countries, like India and China, faced restrictions within the same
compliance period.313
The Paris Agreement is consistent with the Byrd-Hagel resolution,314
a fact that even Senator Chuck Hagel has acknowledged at a congressional
hearing.315 However, because the treaty was not submitted to the Senate for
ratification, it cannot be said that the Paris Agreement has explicit
congressional approval. Instead, President Obama entered into the Paris
agreement as an executive agreement. Yet, as Daniel Bodansky and Peter
Spiro explain, the agreement is better conceived of as an “Executive
Agreement + (EA+).”316 Because the Paris Agreement did not impose
binding legal obligations beyond what was required by the UNFCCC, it has
a form of prior congressional approval.317 Although both an ordinary
executive agreement and an EA+ fall within Category 2 of Justice Jackson’s
famous tripartite categorization in the Youngstown case, they occupy different
ends of the spectrum. An EA+ is closer to Category 1, which is “pursuant to an
express or implied authorization of Congress.”318 In contrast, an ordinary
executive agreement is at the other end of the spectrum, in what Justice Jackson
described as the “twilight zone,” where there is no obvious congressional
support.319 In other words, the Paris Agreement arguably has implicit ex ante

313

Id.
See SUSAN BINIAZ, WHAT HAPPENED TO BYRD-HAGEL? ITS CURIOUS ABSENCE FROM
EVALUATIONS OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT 14–17 (2018), http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/
files/2018/01/Biniaz-2018-1-Byrd-Hagel-article-Working-Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5P2-T6
9G] (discussing the relationship of the Byrd-Hagel Senate resolution and the Paris Agreement).
315
The Need for Leadership to Combat Climate Change and Protect National Security:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Reform, 116th Congress 11–12 (2019)
(statement of Hon. Chuck Hagel, Former Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Defense and Senator) (“I
supported the 2015 Paris Peace Climate Agreement that Secretary Kerry negotiated because
it met the requirements of the Byrd-Hagel resolution, ensuring that all nations—all nations—
take measurable, reportable, and verifiable steps to reduce emissions.”).
316
Daniel Bodansky & Peter Spiro, Executive Agreements+, 49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
885, 887 (2016).
317
In fact, the negotiations almost derailed at the last minute because of a typo that arguably could
have created new legal obligations. John Vidal, How a “Typo” Nearly Derailed the Paris Climate
Deal, GUARDIAN (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2015/
dec/16/how-a-typo-nearly-derailed-the-paris-climate-deal [https://perma.cc/GP5P-J9GS].
318
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring); see also Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 316, at 898.
319
Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 316, at 898.
314
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congressional approval because it is consistent with the UNFCCC.320 Not all
experts agree with the characterization of the Paris Agreement as an Executive
Agreement+.321 Regardless, there is little dispute that it was negotiated within
the scope of the UNFCCC, a duly ratified Article II treaty.322
President Trump has indicated that he would like to re-negotiate the
terms of the Paris Agreement.323 Notably, his withdrawal announcement did
not question climate science, the climate problem, or even having an
international agreement on climate change. Nevertheless, given President
Trump’s stated goal of re-negotiation, does independent climate action by
states undermine the United States’ ability to speak with one voice and reduce
the value of the “bargaining chips” in international negotiations?324 At first
glance, the answer seems to be yes. A President that seeks to pull out of the
Paris Agreement could argue that by already making pledges to reduce
carbon emissions, states and cities engaged in global climate action are
reducing the federal government’s bargaining authority. Writing a decade
ago, Hollis suggested that state participation in the International Climate
Action Plan risked unwarranted interference in the U.S. climate negotiations
by influencing how other nations engaged with the United States.325 As the
discussion of norm sustaining earlier makes clear, domestic coalitions like
the U.S. Climate Alliance are publicly benchmarking their emissions
reductions against the U.S. targets under the Paris Agreement as a way to
demonstrate their support for a treaty that President Trump has repudiated.326
320

See also Jean Galbraith, From Treaties to International Commitments: The Changing
Landscape of Foreign Relations Law, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1675, 1740 (2017) (“Obama made
the Paris Agreement mainly on his own constitutional authority, but he was buttressed in
doing so by the fact that this Agreement furthers both the preexisting UNFCCC and the goals
underlying the Clean Air Act.”).
321
See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Triptych’s End: A Better Framework to Evaluate 21st
Century International Lawmaking, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM 338, 345 (2017) (“Nor do I think the
problem is adequately solved by creating new pigeonholes like ‘executive agreement plus.’”).
322
Id. at 350.
323
The notice deposited with the U.N. in 2017 states that “[u]nless the United States
identifies suitable terms for reengagement,” the country will withdraw from the treaty.
Depository Notification from the Representative of the United States of America to the
United Nations, Nikki R. Haley, addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
C.N.464.2017.TREATIES-XXVII.7.d (Aug. 4, 2017).
324
See Kysar & Meyler, supra note 15, at 1640 (applying the bargaining chip theory to the
context of climate change).
325
Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, supra note 25, at 786. Hollis’s analysis was in
the context of the Compact Clause, but the rationale applies equally well here.
326
See Part I.C. In its legal challenge to California’s Cap-and-Trade Agreement with Quebec,
the Trump Administration appears to be making this argument, even though it does not
explicitly rely on the bargaining chip theory. See Amended Complaint ¶¶ 51–56, United
States v. California, No. 2:19-cv-02142-WBS-EFB (E.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2019), ECF No. 7
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Surely, if a large fraction of the United States has already taken steps to
decarbonize their economies, then the President would not be able to wield
“‘the coercive power of the national economy’ as a tool of diplomacy . . . .”327
However, times have changed. The bargaining chip theory made more
sense prior to the seminal case on greenhouse gas regulation from mobile
sources, Massachusetts v. EPA. One of the reasons that the Environmental
Protection Agency under the administration of the second President Bush gave
for not regulating greenhouse gases from motor vehicles was that “unilateral
EPA regulation of motor-vehicle greenhouse gas emissions might also hamper
the President’s ability to persuade key developing countries to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions.”328 The Supreme Court rejected this argument.329
Prior to Massachusetts, a U.S. District Court had sustained a
challenge to state motor vehicle regulations of greenhouse gases on foreign
affairs preemption grounds.330 However, after the Supreme Court’s decision
in Massachusetts, the district court reversed course and held that “speaking
with one voice” in the climate negotiations did not constitute an actual
“policy” because it was “nothing more than a commitment to negotiate under
certain conditions and according to certain principles.”331 It found that the
“‘bargaining chip’ theory of interference only [made] logical sense if it would
be a rational negotiating strategy to refuse to stop pouring poison into the
well from which all must drink unless your bargaining partner agrees to do
likewise.”332 Another district court came to a similar conclusion in
considering a comparable challenge to state regulation of greenhouse gases
from mobile sources.333
If the “bargaining chip” theory made little sense after Massachusetts,
then it makes even less sense given the “bottom-up” approach of the Paris
Agreement, where every party makes commitments that are nationally

(arguing that California has been asserting its own foreign policy by engaging in agreements
with foreign governments).
327
Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 (citing Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade
Council, 530 U.S. 363, 377 (2000)).
328
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 513–54 (2007).
329
Id. at 523–24.
330
Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Witherspoon, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1183 (E.D. Cal.
2006). The challenged regulations promulgated under the authority of section 43018.5 of the
Cal. Health & Safety Code, which required the California Air Resources Board to “develop
and adopt regulations that achieve the maximum feasible and cost-effective reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles.” Id. at 1163.
331
Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Goldstene, 528 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1186 (E.D. Cal. 2007).
332
Id. at 1187.
333
Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 395–
96 (D. Vt. 2007).
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determined.334 As a result, when Trump critiqued the “burdens” and
“restrictions” of the Paris Agreement,335 he was actually criticizing the
Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) that the United States submitted
under the Obama administration. Moreover, the Trump administration has
complained that the Paris Agreement sets “unrealistic targets” for the United
States while “allowing China to increase such emissions until 2030,” when
in fact, this discrepancy exists simply because the United States had
voluntarily agreed to adopt stricter targets than China.336 The only
internationally mandated rules relate to the disclosure and monitoring of these
targets, not the actual substance of them. The United States could in fact
remain a party to the Paris Agreement but submit a less ambitious NDC that
is more in line with the goals of China.337
Due to the length of time it took to negotiate the Paris Agreement and
the very flexible framework that it adopted, it is unlikely that the United
States would be able to push the international community to re-negotiate the
terms of the treaty. Every nation in the world signed the Paris Agreement or
became a party to it.338 In the wake of President Trump’s announcement,
other global leaders pledged to continue their efforts to uphold the Paris
Agreement and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.339 According to President
Trump’s logic, other countries must increase their own voluntary targets in
order for the United States to make any effort at all. However, this flies
against the theory of mutual disclosure and ratcheting up that is at the heart
of the Paris Agreement. As I have argued elsewhere, when states and cities
publicly disclose their progress towards the Paris goals or engage in
334

Murthy, supra note 14, at 14, 40–43.
Trump, supra note 247.
336
Amended Complaint ¶ 48, United States v. California, No. 2:19-cv-02142-WBS-EFB
(E.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2019), ECF No. 7; see Paris Agreement, supra note 2, art. 4(2) (stating
in part that “[e]ach Party shall prepare, communicate and maintain successive nationally
determined contributions that it intends to achieve”); Murthy, supra note 14, at 10, 15–16
(discussing how these nationally determined contributions are basically voluntary targets that
each country pledges to achieve and that the U.S. could have submitted a weaker target,
instead of withdrawing).
337
Murthy, supra note 14, at 15.
338
The Paris Agreement has 195 signatories, and as of September 7, 2019, 186 countries are
parties. The countries that signed the Agreement but did not subsequently become parties are:
Angola, Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, The Russian Federation, South Sudan, Turkey,
and Yemen. Status of the Paris Agreement, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://trea
ties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27&c
lang=_en [https://perma.cc/QY8A-TMQ3] (last visited Sept. 7, 2019).
339
See, e.g., Daniel Boffey & Arthur Neslen, China and EU Strengthen Promise to Paris
Deal with U.S. Poised to Step Away, GUARDIAN (June 1, 2017), https://www.
theguardian.com/environment/2017/may/31/china-eu-climate-lead-paris-agreement [https://
perma.cc/GZS5-WCKV] (describing global efforts to uphold the Paris Agreement).
335

Vol. 5:4]

Constitutionality of State and Local Action on Climate Change

95

international coalitions, they encourage other nations to heighten the
ambition of their own climate policies.340
3. Dormant foreign affairs preemption
The foregoing analysis suggests that state and local actions on global
climate change would not be subject to foreign affairs preemption based on
either congressional action or the bargaining chip theory. Although
Garamendi has arguably been limited by Medellin,341 an argument could be
made that under Garamendi’s expansive interpretation of executive power,342
subnational efforts on global climate change conflict with President Trump’s
stated goal of withdrawing the United States from the Paris Agreement and/or
re-negotiating the terms. Alternatively, President Trump would have to rely
on the much-criticized doctrine of dormant foreign affairs power. These are
difficult arguments to make for several reasons.
First, this is not a situation where an executive agreement expressly
preempts state claims, or is even supported by implicit congressional
authorization, or history and practice.343 Rather, the statements of President
Trump and other officials would have to be the basis for the preemption and
demonstrate a “clear conflict.”344
Second, the President would have to assert that his independent
constitutional powers encompass environmental regulation, which is not a
very plausible argument.345 Congress has the power to enact environmental
statutes, which in turn can delegate authority to the executive branch and to
the states.346 However, with a few exceptions, states can enact more stringent
air pollution control laws under the Clean Air Act—including on greenhouse
gases.347 State and local governments also have independent authority in
some areas, such as land use and zoning.348 The Supreme Court has long
340

Murthy, supra note 14, at 31–37.
See Part III.A.2; Wuerth, supra note 287, at 936–38.
342
See generally Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (holding that
California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act of 1999 interfered with the President’s
exercise of foreign policy and was thus preempted).
343
But cf. Dames v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 680, 686 (1981) (holding that “Congress has
implicitly approved the practice of claim settlement by executive agreement” by enacting the
International Claims Settlement Act).
344
Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 421; Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp.2d
1151, 1182–84 (E.D. Cal. 2007).
345
Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 316, at 906.
346
See generally Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–
1387 (1972); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (1970).
347
See generally Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
348
Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1187–88.
341
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recognized that a “[s]tate has an interest independent of and behind the titles
of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain.”349
Although Garamendi involved insurance regulation,,350 the Court
characterized the goal of the state law as related to foreign policy, i.e., that the
real purpose of the California law was not the “evaluation of corporate
reliability” but the vindication of Holocaust survivor claims—which seems to
fall more squarely within traditional executive power.351 Similarly, in Zschernig,
the Supreme Court was concerned that state court judges were using probate
cases to cast aspersions on communist countries at the height of the Cold War.352
In contrast, states and cities are motivated to take action on climate
change for the health and welfare of their own citizens353 and because it is a
“wicked” multi-level problem that demands coordinated action across all
scales of government and sectors of the economy.354 With the rise of extreme
weather patterns, state and local officials are increasingly shouldering the
challenges of addressing wildfires, floods, and other catastrophic events, and
many state and local governments are motivated to enact policies about
climate change simply for their own benefit.355 In this respect, the nature of
the climate activity is incredibly broad and singularly different from the kinds
of activities that have faced conflict preemption. When state and local
governments enter into transnational networks, domestic coalitions, or
bilateral agreements on climate change, they are not singling out a particular
country, as in Crosby, or a set of policies issued by particular nations during
wartime hostilities, as in Garamendi.356
The Cap-and-Trade Agreement, however, arguably creates a situation
where California is judging the integrity of another jurisdiction’s regulations,
and by extension, its broader economic and political system.357 Prior to
linking with another jurisdiction, the governor must ensure that the linked
349
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518–19 (quoting Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230,
237 (1907)).
350
Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 409–11 (2003).
351
Id. at 426.
352
The state court statements were rather outlandish: “This court would consider sending
money out of this country and into Hungary tantamount to putting funds within the grasp of
the Communists . . . . If you want to say that I’m prejudiced, you can, because when it comes
to Communism I’m a bigoted anti-Communist.” Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 437 n.8
(1968) (internal citations omitted).
353
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518–19; Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, 529 F. Supp. 2d at
1187–88.
354
Lazarus, supra note 45; Osofsky, supra note 45.
355
See, e.g., CLIMATE CHANGE PROPOSED SCOPING PLAN, supra note 100, at ES8–ES12
(discussing the economic benefits of climate policies for California).
356
Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 420; Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 366–
67 (2000).
357
Chemerinsky, supra note 15, at 52; Kysar & Meyler, supra note 15, at 1657–58.
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cap-and-trade system would have environmental and enforcement
requirements that are “equivalent to or stricter than” the California program,
and that there be no “significant liability” imposed on California for any
“failure” associated with the linkage.358 However, this regulation is
fundamentally about ensuring that the quality of California’s domestic
emissions trading market is not compromised by linking to another market.
If the Garamendi balancing test is applied,359 California’s state interest in
addressing climate change is surely stronger than a possible national concern
about offending Canada, especially since California and Quebec developed
their cap-and-trade regulations cooperatively to ensure harmonization.
Consider, instead, if California passed a law that prevented the state
procurement of goods from India on the grounds that India had not done
enough to switch from coal to renewable energy. If the United States was in
negotiations with India on its renewable energy policy,360 such nationspecific legislation would more likely be perceived as a conflict with U.S.
diplomacy. This is the kind of activity that would be more likely to face
credible preemption grounds under Garamendi because the state law is
targeted action against a particular country. For example, during the 1980s,
many states adopted divestment laws targeting the apartheid regime of South
Africa. At the time, these statutes were widely believed to be a constitutional
exercise of power.361 However, the Supreme Court’s holdings in 2000 striking
358

CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12894(f) (West 2020); CAL. AIR RES. BD., supra note 161, at 1; see
also Wright, supra note 16, at 10,485 (describing the confirmation that these requirements
had been met prior to the California and Quebec linkage).
359
Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 420.
360
Hypothetically, if the United States and India entered into an executive agreement that
arguably conflicted with the state law, then it would be important to examine any preemption
arguments that could also be made under the Supremacy Clause, and not just the dormant
foreign affairs power.
361
The Department of Justice determined that state divestment statutes aimed at the apartheid
South Africa regime would survive constitutional scrutiny because states were legitimately
exercising their rights to spend and invest their own funds. Constitutionality of South African
Divestment Statutes Enacted by State and Local Governments, 10 Op. O.L.C. 49, 54–55
(1986). The one state supreme court to rule on the matter also determined that the city
ordinance in question was not preempted, did not violate the Foreign Commerce Clause, and
did not otherwise intrude on the federal government’s power to regulate foreign policy. See
Bd. of Trs. v. Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 757 (Md. 1989) (upholding Baltimore city ordinance
mandating that city pension funds divest from companies doing business with South Africa);
see also MARTHA F. DAVIS, JOANNA KALB & RISA E. KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS
ADVOCACY IN THE UNITED STATES 422 (2014); Martha F. Davis, Thinking Globally, Acting
Locally: States, Municipalities, and International Human Rights, in BRINGING HUMAN
RIGHTS HOME: A HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 261–63 (Cynthia
Soohoo, Catherine Albisa & Martha F. Davis eds., 2009) (discussing the history of local antiapartheid measures and federal acquiescence to their constitutionality).
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down a Massachusetts statute directed at Burma in Crosby,362 and in 2003
striking down a California law directed at insurance companies who had issued
policies to Holocaust victims in Garamendi,363 suggest that the South African
divestment laws could possibly cross the constitutional line.364 In contrast,
states and cities participate in international climate networks, domestic
coalitions, or bilateral agreements because climate change is a real problem
in which they have a legitimate interest.365
National security is one area where the Supreme Court is more
deferential to executive assertions of power.366 Thus, in an important strategic
move in its recent litigation, the Trump administration has framed the
California-Quebec Cap-and-Trade Agreement as an issue “interwoven” with
economic growth and national security matters.367 There is little doubt that
many aspects of climate change present real national security threats; for
example, increased droughts and floods contribute to civil instability in

362

Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000).
Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 401.
364
Even state and local activity that goes beyond what is constitutionally permissible,
however, could be helpful in shaping national policy on a global issue. For example, Crosby
and Garamendi could also be understood as examples of the “norm sustaining” of
international human rights values by subnational actors. Murthy, supra note 14, at 7. The
Massachusetts law at issue in Crosby was a central focus of U.S. discussions with European
Union officials and no doubt influenced the international dialogue about Burma. Crosby, 530
U.S. at 384. Moreover, Congress enacted a statute imposing sanctions on Burma only three
months after the Massachusetts law was enacted. Id. at 368. Similarly, the California
legislature adopted the Holocaust Victims Insurance Recovery Act at issue in Garamendi in
part “to encourage the development of a resolution to these issues through the international
process or through direct action by the State of California, as necessary.” Garamendi, 539
U.S. at 434 (citation omitted). U.S. negotiations were also directly impacted by California’s
law. Id. at 411. This kind of norm sustaining, however, distinguishes the human rights and
climate contexts because states and cities have not adopted climate legislation that is targeted
against a particular country.
365
See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007) (holding that Massachusetts
had standing to challenge the EPA’s failure to regulate greenhouse gases because the state’s
“well-founded desire to preserve its sovereign territory” was threatened by climate change).
366
See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (upholding the President’s broad
authority to restrict entry into the U.S. by foreign nationals on national security grounds); see
also Shalini Bhargava Ray, Plenary Power and Animus in Immigration Law, 80 OHIO ST. L.J.
13, 26–27, 59–61 (2019) (discussing the Supreme Court’s opinion in Trump v. Hawaii as an
exercise in deference to the President’s national security interests).
367
See Amended Complaint ¶ 33, United States of America v. California, No. 2:19-cv02142-WBS-EFB (E.D. CA. Nov. 19, 2019), ECF No. 7 (seeking injunctive and declaratory
relief against the State of California for its cap-and-trade agreement with the provincial
government of Quebec).
363

Vol. 5:4]

Constitutionality of State and Local Action on Climate Change

99

regions of the world where the United States has strategic interests.368
However, it is not clear exactly how a policy tool to address climate change,
such as California’s market-based approach to greenhouse gas reductions,
creates national security concerns.
If the President is correct that his power over the California-Quebec
Cap-and-Trade Agreement stems from his authority to “reconcil[e] protection
of the environment, promotion of economic growth, and maintenance of
national security,”369 then, arguably, all state and local actions on climate
change could fall within his executive power. As a result, every single state
or local action to address climate change, including state-based emissions
trading programs, zoning decisions, investments in public transportation and
changes in building codes, would potentially fall within presidential power.
In other words, an assertion of executive authority based on national security
would likely prove too much in the climate change context. Such an argument
would violate the basic tenets of federalism and separation of powers on
which our government was founded.
Finally, the global context of climate change is also distinct from
other kinds of foreign affairs problems. Climate change is a multi-scalar
problem and the international community has embraced state and local action
on climate change.370 The United States has agreed to decisions of the
Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC specifically endorsing the
participation of subnational governments and creating the NAZCA platform
for the recording of pledges by all non-state actors.371

368

See generally The Need for Leadership to Combat Climate Change and Protect National
Security, supra note 315 (discussing the security costs imposed by climate change); U.S. DEP’T
OF DEFENSE, REPORT ON EFFECTS OF A CHANGING CLIMATE TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
(2019), https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2019/01/sec_335_ndaa-report_effects_
of_a_changing_climate_to_dod.pdf [https://perma.cc/786L-PAD2] (explaining the impact that
climate change has and will have on the Department of Defense).
369
Amended Complaint ¶ 33, United States of America v. California, No. 2:19-cv-02142WBS-EFB (E.D. CA. Nov. 19, 2019), ECF No. 7.
370
See Paris Agreement, supra note 2, pmbl., ¶¶ 116–23, 133–36, arts. 7.2, 11.2 (establishing
a global goal on reducing vulnerability to climate change and meeting the temperature target
outlined in art. 2); see also Harro van Asselt & Stefan Böβner, The Shape of Things to Come:
Global Climate Governance After Paris, 10 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 46, 56–57 (2016)
(discussing climate action taken by states since the Paris Agreement); Susan Biniaz, Trump vs.
International Law: Thoughts on the Paris Agreement and U.S. Climate Diplomacy, OPINIOJURIS
(Mar. 10, 2018), http://opiniojuris.org/2018/10/03/trump-vs-international-law-thoughts-on-theparis-agreement-and-u-s-climate-diplomacy [https://perma.cc/JRJ8-RD2W] (discussing nonstate
actors and subnational actors who remain committed to climate reform despite the United States’s
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement).
371
Paris Agreement, supra note 2, at ¶¶ 117, 133, 134.
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In contrast, in both Crosby and Garamendi, the United States faced
significant diplomatic pressure to stop the state action.372 Although the U.S.
government did not oppose the probate law at issue in Zschernig, the Court
found that the state law “as construed” 373 had “more than ‘some incidental
or indirect effect in foreign countries,’” and, in fact, had “great potential for
disruption or embarrassment.”374 Given the support that other countries have
shown for climate action by states and local governments everywhere,
including in the United States, it is difficult to see how these subnational
contributions to climate change would result in the kind of diplomatic
embarrassment at issue in the earlier cases.375
Given that the Clean Air Act has been interpreted to cover greenhouse
gases, that the United States has ratified the UNFCCC, and that there is
almost no chance that the terms of the Paris Agreement would be renegotiated, it is difficult to say what actions the President alone could take
that would be constitutionally sufficient to preempt the kinds of state and local
action on global climate change discussed in this Article. This probably explains
why the Trump administration has sought to frame the California-Quebec Capand-Trade Agreement as a national security matter in its legal challenge
because that gives the executive branch a basis for asserting greater authority.
The President’s actions would be on stronger ground if he were acting
closer to Category 1 of Justice Jackson’s framework, which is “pursuant to
an express or implied authorization of Congress.”376 Congress has the
authority to preempt state and local action on global climate change, but for
the time being, Congress has not taken such action. Thus, at least for the
moment, it is unlikely that the transnational networks, domestic coalitions, and
372

Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 (2003); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade
Council, 530 U.S. 363, 382–83 (2000).
373
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440 (1968). The “as construed” language allowed the
Court to distinguish Zschernig from a similar case decided several decades earlier, where the
Court had upheld a nearly identical state inheritance statute from California, in Clark v. Allen.
331 U.S. 503 (1947); see also GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 115, 118–20 (discussing
the Office of Legal Counsel’s opinion that anti-apartheid divestment laws would pass judicial
review under the Dormant Foreign Affairs doctrine as elaborated on in Zschernig).
374
Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434–35 (quoting Clark, 331 U.S. at 516–17).
375
Similarly, in Medellin, some diplomatic embarrassment would have occurred when the
state of Texas took a position that was inconsistent with the executive branch concerning the
enforceability of a decision of the International Court of Justice interpreting the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 520 (2008) (noting
that the “dissent worries that our decision casts doubt on some seventy-odd treaties under
which the United States has agreed to submit disputes to the ICJ”). However, the Supreme Court
still held that the treaty was not self-executing, and that it was up to Congress to pass
implementing legislation. Id. Likewise, it is Congress, not the President, who has the authority to
preempt the kinds of state action on global climate change discussed in this Article.
376
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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bilateral agreements on climate change discussed in this Article would be
struck down on preemption grounds under either the Supremacy Clause or the
dormant foreign affairs doctrine. This argument is buttressed by more recent
cases, which suggest a trend towards the “normalization” of foreign affairs law.
C. “Normalization” Trend
Historically, foreign affairs law has been seen as exceptional, with
greater power attributed to the federal government than in domestic cases.377
However, scholars have posited that there is now a trend towards the
“normalization” of foreign affairs law, with cases being treated more like
domestic law. Ganesh Sitaraman and Ingrid Wuerth argue that “[o]ver the
last twenty-five years, in a series of decisions on the core areas of
exceptionalism—justiciability, federalism, and executive power—the Supreme
Court has rejected the idea that foreign affairs are different from domestic
affairs.”378 This legal trend is supported by the reality that, in many instances, it
is difficult to distinguish between purely domestic and foreign activity.379
Medellin v. Texas,380 for example, is often understood as a decision
on treaty self-execution, but it is also a case about the limits of executive
preemption of state law.381 As discussed earlier,382 the Supreme Court held
that the President lacked the authority to overturn a state court decision
denying a habeas corpus petition. Sitaraman and Wuerth suggest that the
“outcome and reasoning in Medellin represented a major step in normalizing
foreign relations law. The Court did not rely on the unique needs of the
President or the federal government, but instead applied basic separation of
powers and federalism principles.”383

377

See Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist
Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529, 539 n.51 (1999) (explaining that the usual constitutional
restraints on the federal government’s exercise of power do not apply to foreign affairs); see
also Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1089,
1096 (1999) (describing “foreign affairs exceptionalism” as “the view that the federal
government’s foreign affairs powers are subject to a . . . more relaxed set of constitutional
restraints than those that govern its domestic powers”); Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign
Affairs) Constitution, supra note 22, at 652–53 (noting the historical exceptionalism of
foreign affairs law).
378
Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 13, at 1901.
379
GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 131.
380
552 U.S. 491 (2008).
381
Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 13, at 1929.
382
See Part III.A.2.
383
Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 13, at 1930.
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Similarly, in U.S. v. Bond,384 the Court applied standard statutory
interpretation to a preemption issue involving the Chemical Weapons
Implementation Act. The Court might have reasoned that statutes related to
foreign policy presumptively preempt state law, but it did not. In Bond, the Court
refused to find that the Chemical Weapons Treaty could be used to prosecute the
actions of a woman in a romantic triangle who had tried to poison her former
friend.385 In reaching this holding, the Court carefully avoided overturning
Missouri v. Holland, a seminal case from 1920, which held that the federal
government could execute a treaty in an area that would otherwise fall within the
states’ reserved power under the Tenth Amendment.386 In holding that the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act was a valid exercise of federal power, the Holland
court had determined that the scope of the Treaty Power was greater than that
of the Commerce Clause.387 In side-stepping the constitutional questions at
issue in Holland, the Bond court returned to the kind of federalism analysis
seen in domestic cases.388
For some scholars, the normalization trend could go even further. For
example, Peter Spiro argues that the rationale for the “exclusivity doctrine”
is becoming obsolete.389 In addition to constitutional doctrinal shifts, he
points to globalization and changes in international law to support his
argument that power over foreign relations should be devolved to subnational
states.390 Such subnational participation in an international treaty regime
would not be that unusual when one considers that some nations have
expressly consented to allow subnational states to become parties to a
treaty391 or participate in treaty processes.392 Although such action would not
be constitutionally permissible in the United States, the United States has
implicitly recognized that subnational states have a legal relevance to
international law. For example, Spiro points out that the World Trade
Organization Agreement on Government Procurement only requires national
384

572 U.S. 844 (2014).
Id. at 866.
386
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432–35 (1920). However, this view of the relationship
between Bond and Holland is not universal. See GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 186–
87 (claiming that the Court “abandoned Holland,” but failed at its attempt to “avoid the
constitutional issues raised by Holland”).
387
Holland, 252 U.S. at 435.
388
See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 13, at 1928 n.173.
389
Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, supra note 22, at 1225–27.
390
Id. at 1260–61.
391
See Hollis, supra note 79, at 146–47 (discussing the participation of various subnational
entities in international treaties).
392
See Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, supra note 41, at 593–94
(discussing limited state participation in treaty processes before the World Trade
Organization and an appearance by Quebec before the Human Rights Committee).
385
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accession to the extent that it is consistent with subsequent subnational
agreement.393 In other words, the national government only accepts treaty
responsibility for those states that have accepted these specific obligations.
However, not all scholars subscribe to the “normalization” view,
especially in light of several other recent decisions by the Supreme Court.
For example, in Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (“Zivotofsky II”),394 the
Supreme Court held recognition of foreign governments is a “topic on which
the Nation “must ‘speak … with one voice’” and “[t]hat voice must be the
President’s.”395 The majority opinion offered some caveats, stating “whether
the realm is foreign or domestic, it is still the Legislative Branch, not the
Executive Branch, that makes the law”396 and that the scope of the President’s
power is “quite narrow.”397 However, the decision has been interpreted as an
extensive expansion of executive power. As Justice Roberts observed in his
dissent, “[n]ever before has this Court accepted a President’s direct defiance
of an Act of Congress in the field of foreign affairs.”398
Jack Goldsmith has argued that “Zivotofsky II is the most important
Supreme Court decision ever on the sources and scope of the President's
independent and exclusive powers to conduct foreign relations—powers that
fall in Justice Jackson's Youngstown Categories Two and Three,
respectively.”399 He predicts that executive branch attorneys will interpret the
decision very broadly to expand presidential power in foreign affairs.400 Even
Spiro, who otherwise subscribes to the normalization theory, acknowledges
that Zivotofsky II “fits the conventional, exceptionalist approach to foreign
relations.”401 But he finds a way to reconcile the normalization and
exceptionalism debates by pointing to the unique facts of the case and
393

Id. at 592. This approach is similar to the “federalism understandings” approach taken by
the United States with respect to human rights treaties, as discussed in Part III.D.
394
135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). The Zivotofsky case concerned whether Israel could be placed next
to Jerusalem on the birthplace line of a U.S. passport. The U.S. State Department had a
longstanding position that the United States does not recognize any country as having sovereignty
over Jerusalem. However, when Congress passed the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, it
specifically allowed citizens born in Jerusalem to list their birthplace as Israel. The first time that
the case went before the Supreme Court, the Court held that the constitutional dispute between
the Executive branch and Congress was justiciable rather than a political question. Zivotofsky ex
rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton (Zivotofsky I), 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1425 (2012). Zivotofsky I supports the
normalization argument. See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 13, at 1925 .
395
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2086 (2015) (Zivotofsky II),
(quoting Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 (2003)).
396
Id. at 2090.
397
Id. at 2095.
398
Id. at 2113 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
399
Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 114.
400
Id. at 146.
401
Spiro, Normalizing Foreign Relations Law, supra note 22, at 23.
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observing that the “Israel-Palestine dynamic is a throwback to the twentieth
century if not a much earlier one.”402
In addition, Stephen Vladeck points out that even if the Supreme
Court has embraced normalization, lower courts have not necessarily
followed suit.403 The denial of certiorari in those cases raises questions about
the strength and duration of any perceived trend towards normalization.
Trump v. Hawaii404 is another recent “exceptional” foreign affairs
case. On national security grounds, the Supreme Court upheld the President’s
broad authority to issue a “Muslim ban” to restrict entry into the United States
by foreign nationals. The Court applied rational basis review because national
security concerns provided an independent justification for the travel ban,405
even though the evidence of discrimination would likely have been sufficient
to establish a violation of the Establishment Clause.406 As noted earlier, the
Trump Administration has sought to frame the California-Quebec Cap-andTrade Agreement in terms of national security, presumably as a way to open
the door to greater deference to executive power under Trump v. Hawaii.
Moreover, whether climate change-related foreign affairs issues
would likely be treated as “normal” or “exceptional” may also depend on the
degree of climate change skepticism that remains on the Court, as evidenced
by the dissenting opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA.407 A recent email
exchange between U.S. federal judges that was leaked to the public further
reveals that some judges are even hostile to receiving “neutral, objective
information” about climate change from the judiciary.408 Such distrust about
climate science may mean that at least some courts would subject subnational
action on global climate change to a stricter preemption standard. However,
judges more concerned about federalism may be inclined to apply the same
402

Id. at 25.
See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Exceptionalism of Foreign Relations Normalization, 128
HARV. L. REV. F. 322, 323 (2014).
404
138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
405
Id. at 2420–21.
406
Id. at 2433 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also Ray, supra note 366, at 19 (arguing that
“courts should use a mixed motives analysis to review an exclusion law where plaintiffs have
direct evidence of animus”).
407
549 U.S. 497, 560 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
408
After a U.S. district court judge forwarded an email about an upcoming climate-change
seminar co-sponsored by the research and education agency of the judiciary branch, a judge
on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit chastised him, writing: “The jurisdiction
assigned to you does not include saving the planet. . . The supposedly science and stuff you
are now sponsoring is nothing of the sort.” Ann E. Marimow, A Federal Judge in D.C. Hit
‘Reply All,’ and Now There’s a Formal Question About His Decorum, WASH. POST (Aug.
16, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/a-federal-judge-in-dc-hitreply-all-and-now-theres-a-formal-question-about-his-decorum/2019/08/15/551155b4-ba17
-11e9-b3b4-2bb69e8c4e39_story.html [https://perma.cc/K83J-SZNN].
403
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preemption standards to foreign affairs and domestic activities, despite their
concerns about the perceived uncertainty of climate science.
In short, if the normalization theory is applied to the climate change
activities of states and cities, then it suggests that global-oriented activities
are more likely to survive constitutional scrutiny. Even if the broader trend
towards normalization does not continue, it is possible that climate change
challenges could be treated differently. The nature of climate change is multilevel and multi-scalar, which distinguishes it from more recent “exceptional”
cases involving the recognition of a foreign state409 or national security.410
Given the inherently global nature of climate change, it is hard to articulate a
justification for stricter treatment of internationally-oriented subnational
action, as compared to purely domestic activities.
D. Comparative Insights from Human Rights Law
Questions of foreign affairs federalism within the human rights
system offer comparative insights for analyses of subnational climate action.
Just as states and cities have declared their support for the Paris Agreement,
numerous cities have declared themselves to be “human rights cities,” often
by endorsing international human rights standards and treaties.411 Although
not an official “human rights city,” San Francisco has been a leader on human
rights and has explicitly adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) as part of its municipal
law.412 As with climate issues, these subnational governments are not official

409

Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
See Part III.C (discussing Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018)).
411
See generally Barbara Oomen & Moritz Baumgärtel, Human Rights Cities, in THE SAGE
HANDBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS 709–30 (Anja Mihr & Mark Gibney eds., 2014) (discussing
the development and history of human rights cities); Davis, supra note 359; Martha F. Davis,
The Upside of the Downside: Local Human Rights and the Federalism Clauses, 62 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 921, 931 (2018) (discussing the popularization of both human rights cities and
sanctuary jurisdictions); Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional Possibilities
for Incorporation of Human Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 245, 277–
79 (2001) (noting the adoption of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women by the City of San Francisco in 1998).
412
S.F., CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 12K.4(a) (1998) (implementing locally the United Nations
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW));
CITY AND CTY. OF S.F., DEP’T ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, CEDAW IN ACTION: LOCAL
IMPLEMENTATION IN THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO (2010); see also Judith
Resnick, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s
Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1636 (2006) (noting public backlash to the idea
of the United States joining CEDAW and qualified support for doing so within the Clinton
Administration).
410
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parties to the treaties but, instead, seek to rebrand their existing efforts and
develop new laws that are consistent with international norms.
Both the international climate and human rights treaty regimes have
also welcomed the participation of non-state actors. The submission of
shadow human rights reports to U.N. treaty bodies is a common practice of
non-governmental actors,413 and some U.S. cities have also done this. For
example, the city of Berkeley submitted a report to a U.N. human rights treaty
committee in 2009, apparently the first city in the United States to do so.414
These efforts are not dissimilar from efforts of domestic coalitions—such as
the U.S. Climate Alliance, We Are Still In, and American’s Pledge—to report
their progress towards the initial U.S. goals under the Paris Agreement in
appropriate forums, such as NAZCA, as discussed in Part I.C. Some scholars
have also argued for more direct subnational participation in human rights
treaty regimes,415 echoing calls to allow subnational governments to
participate even more directly in international climate agreements.416
A useful comparative perspective is also gained from examining the
scholarly discourse concerning foreign affairs federalism and the U.S.
ratification of human rights treaties. The United States has ratified three of
the major human rights treaties with “federalism understandings.”417 For
example, the federalism clause submitted alongside the U.S. ratification of
the Convention Against Torture states:
[T]he United States understands that this Convention shall be
implemented by the Federal Government to the extent that it
exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters
covered by the Convention, and otherwise by the state and
local governments . . . the United States Government shall
413

For example, as part of the Universal Periodic Review, the Human Rights Council
compiles a report summarizing all of the stakeholder submissions, including from non-state
actors. See, e.g., Office of the U.N. Comm’r for Human Rights, United States of America,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/EG.6/22/USA/3 (2015) (summarizing ninety-one stakeholders’
submissions to the universal periodic review regarding the United States).
414
See BERKELEY CITY COUNCIL, MOTION ON UNITED NATIONS TREATY REPORTS (2011),
http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/session9/US/MCLI_MeiklejohnCivilLibertiesI
nstitute_Annex2.pdf [https://perma.cc/DXS6-NLU2] (affirming Berkley City’s compliance with
U.N. Treaty recommendations); Martha F. Davis, Cities, Human Rights and Accountability, in
GLOBAL URBAN JUSTICE: THE RISE OF HUMAN RIGHTS CITIES 31 (Barbara Oomen, Martha F.
Davis & Michele Grigolo eds., 2016) (noting Berkeley’s early compliance with the reporting
requirements of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination).
415
Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, supra note 41, at 590 (“For example,
though the United States refused to agree to the ICCPR’s ban on executing juvenile
offenders, about half of the states already prohibit such executions on their own. Many,
presumably, would sign on to the treaty prohibition if given the opportunity.”).
416
See generally Esty & Adler, supra note 96.
417
Davis, The Upside of the Downside, supra note 411, at 922.
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take measures appropriate to the Federal system to the end that
the competent authorities of the constituent units of the United
States of America may take appropriate measures for the
fulfillment of the Convention.418
These clauses have been criticized for allowing the United States to
use federalism as a way to shield itself from international human rights
obligations.419 Some scholars have argued that these types of federalism
clauses provide state and local governments with the necessary authority to
implement human rights and to have their policies protected as long as they
are otherwise in fulfillment of the treaties.420 Although this is not a view that
has gone without criticism, it offers an interesting perspective on the nature of
the conflict. As Martha Davis suggests, “[r]ather than permit general federal
preemption of state prerogatives through purported exercise of treaty power, the
federalism understanding would shield ‘appropriate’ rights-protective measures
taken by local governments within their sphere of authority.”421 In other words,
states and local governments can adopt policies inconsistent with the national
government, as long as they are consistent with the treaty obligations—which is
arguably exactly what is happening in the climate context.
The United States did not ratify the UNFCCC or accede to the Paris
Agreement with any federalism understandings. However, in theory, it could
have because states and cities have jurisdictional authority over key
greenhouse gas mitigation pathways, such as decisions over land-use, zoning,
public transit and building codes.422 Would it be possible to interpret the U.S.
obligations under the UNFCCC (and under the Paris Agreement until any
withdrawal is formalized) as if there was an implicit federalism
418

136 CONG. REC. S17,492 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
See, e.g., Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, supra note 41, at 568, 588–
89 (describing a form of international joint and several liability for national and state actors
that would minimize the ability of governments to claim that federalism or devolution
excuses them from their international obligations).
420
Compare Davis, The Upside of the Downside, supra note 411, at 937 (discussing the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ federalism understanding), and Jordan
J. Paust, Customary International Law and Human Rights Treaties are Law of the United
States, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 301, 330–31 (1999) (noting that “nothing in the federal clauses
prohibits state or sub-state entities from executing or further implementing” certain treaties),
with Bradley Roth, Understanding the “Understanding”: Federalism Constraints on Human
Rights Implementation, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 891, 905 (2001) (noting that the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provisions covered by its federalism understanding
are also those “least likely to be federally preempted”). For a description of the subnational
adoption of human rights treaties as an example of “dialogic federalism” because it creates
a dialogue among different levels of government with respect to international human rights
law, see Powell, supra note 411, at 250.
421
Davis, The Upside of the Downside, supra note 411, at 937.
422
See Esty & Adler, supra note 96, at 281–82.
419
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understanding? This is not a far-fetched idea when one considers the Supreme
Court’s decision in Bond, which held that the Chemical Weapons Convention
was not violated by an isolated act of poisoning by a jilted lover.423 Davis has
suggested that “the Bond court read into the treaty a federalism clause that
circumscribed the federal ability to implement the treaty at every level of
government and reserved such implementation activities for state and local
governments.”424
If the UNFCCC was interpreted in a similar way, then states and cities
could permissibly take action to the limits of their jurisdiction as long as this
action was consistent with the treaty’s goals—and even if this subnational
action was arguably in conflict with national policy. I do not mean to suggest
that the U.S. government should cabin its state responsibility by adopting
future climate agreements with federalism understandings. Rather, I engage
in this comparative analysis to suggest a way of reconciling inconsistent
national and subnational positions. This discussion also demonstrates that the
interplay between international, national, state, and local law is not unique to
the climate arena, but pervades other areas of law, like human rights.425
I now turn to the final area of constitutional analysis relevant to
foreign affairs federalism: the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause.
IV. DORMANT FOREIGN COMMERCE CLAUSE
A. Doctrine: Two-Pronged Test
Congress has the constitutional authority “[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes.”426 Most dormant Commerce Clause cases arise in the context of
domestic interstate commerce. Under the modern dormant Commerce Clause
test, a state law that treats in-state and out-of-state economic interests
differently will likely be struck down as a discriminatory law.427 However, if
it is a nondiscriminatory law that “regulates evenhandedly with only
‘incidental’ effects on interstate commerce,”428 then the court engages in a
423

Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 866 (2014).
Davis, The Upside of the Downside, supra note 411, at 929.
425
See, e.g., Powell, supra note 411.
426
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
427
See Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994) (striking down
a state law that imposed higher costs on waste generated out of state); Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978) (striking down a New Jersey law that prohibited out of state
waste on the grounds that it “falls squarely within the area that the Commerce Clause puts
off limits to state regulation”).
428
Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 99 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979)).
424
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balancing test and will uphold the law unless the burden on interstate
commerce is excessive compared to local benefits.429 The one key exception
is when the state acts as a market participant, and not just a regulator.430 At
least in the domestic context, Congress can “authorize state regulations that
burden or discriminate against interstate commerce” provided that “such an
intent is clearly expressed.”431 Moreover, the dormant Commerce Clause
does not prevent “coordinated action” between the federal government and
states in regulating interstate commerce.432
The Supreme Court has made clear that “[w]hen construing Congress’
power to ‘regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,’ a more extensive
constitutional inquiry is required.”433 However, the Court has only considered
the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause in cases involving taxation. In
addition to the usual factors applied in a domestic context,434 the Court has
applied two additional factors.435 The Court must first inquire whether there

429

Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (striking down an Arizona law that
required local packaging of cantaloupe as an excessive burden on commerce).
430
Compare Hughes v. Alexandria, 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (upholding a Maryland junked auto
law), with S.-Cent. Timber v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) (striking down Alaska law on
timber on the grounds that it was regulating downstream processing). The Court has not yet
decided a case involving a market participant exception in the context of the DFCC. Reeves,
Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438 n.9 (1980) (“We have no occasion to explore the limits
imposed on state proprietary actions by the ‘foreign commerce’ Clause . . . . We note,
however, that Commerce Clause scrutiny may well be more rigorous when a restraint on
foreign commerce is alleged.”); see also GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 160–61
(describing the market participant exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause).
431
Hillside Dairy, Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59, 66 (2003); see also Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd.
of Governors Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 174 (1985) (“When Congress so chooses,
state actions which it plainly authorizes are invulnerable to constitutional attack under the
Commerce Clause.”).
432
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 434 (1946); see also Norman Williams,
Why Congress May Not Overrule the Dormant Commerce Clause, 53 UCLA L. REV 153,
157 (2005) (explaining the “coordinated action” rationale for the Dormant Commerce Clause
and criticisms thereof).
433
Japan Line v. Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 446 (1979); see also Reeves, 447 U.S. at 437–
38 n.9 (“Commerce Clause scrutiny may well be more rigorous when a restraint on foreign
commerce is alleged.”).
434
The Court has “sustained a tax against Commerce Clause challenge when the tax is
applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned,
does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services
provided by the State.” Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977); see
also Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959) (finding that states
may properly tax foreign corporations doing business in those states).
435
See generally Itel Containers Int’l. Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60 (1993) (ruling that
a state sales tax on international shipping containers did not conflict with the Foreign
Commerce Clause).
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is an “enhanced risk of multiple taxation.”436 Second, it should examine
whether the tax prevents the Federal Government from “speak[ing] with one
voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments.”437
As the Court subsequently noted, “a state tax at variance with federal policy
will violate the ‘one voice’ standard if it either implicates foreign policy
issues which must be left to the Federal Government or violates a clear
federal directive.”438 The Court was motivated to develop these additional
criteria due to the “evidence that the Founders intended the scope of the
foreign commerce power to be . . . greater” than the power to regulate
interstate commerce.439
The two-pronged test applied in the foreign context comes from
Japan Line v. County of Los Angeles, where the Supreme Court struck down
a California ad valorem property tax on foreign-owned cargo ships under the
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause.440 The U.S. interest in a uniform foreign
policy was supported by the fact that the United States and Japan were parties
to a relevant multi-lateral treaty governing the issue.441 The asymmetry in
taxation also led the Court to be concerned about retaliation that “would be
felt by the Nation as a whole,” and not just the taxing state.442 The Court did
not find it dispositive that Congress had failed to preempt state law by
affirmative regulation.443
In a series of tax cases decided after Japan Line, however, the
Supreme Court appears to have retreated from the “one voice” theory by
sustaining state laws that were challenged under the dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause.444 For example, in Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Board
436

Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 446.
Id. at 449 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Michelin Tire Corp. v Wages, 423
U.S. 276, 285 (1976)); see also Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 311
(1994) (“In ‘the unique context of foreign commerce,’ a State’s power is further constrained
because of ‘the special need for federal uniformity.’” (quoting Wardair Can., Inc. v. Fla.
Dep’t of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 8 (1986))).
438
Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983).
439
Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448.
440
Id.
441
Id. at 452–55 (discussing the Customs Convention on Containers, which required that
“containers temporarily imported are admitted free of ‘all duties and taxes whatsoever
chargeable by reason of importation.’”).
442
Id. at 453.
443
Id. at 454.
444
See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994) (holding that
California’s worldwide combined reporting method of assessing taxes on foreign and
domestic corporations did not offend the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause); Itel
Containers Intern. Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60 (1993) (upholding Tennessee’s sales
tax); Wardair Can., Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1 (1986) (rejecting a challenge
437
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of California, the Supreme Court once again rejected a challenge to
California’s taxation scheme under the dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause.445 The Court held, in part, that California’s worldwide combined
reporting scheme did not prevent the national government from “‘speaking
with one voice’ in international trade.”446 The Court concluded that Congress
had the opportunity to preempt state laws on the taxation of multinational
companies—and had even studied and considered such legislation—but
ultimately did not enact any preemptive legislation.447 The Court “discern[ed]
no ‘specific indications of congressional intent’ to bar the state action.”448
Like the dormant foreign affairs power doctrine, the dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause doctrine is perceived to be on the decline.449 The last time
that the Supreme Court struck down a case on dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause grounds was 1992.450 In many ways, Japan Line and the few
subsequent cases that have been found to violate the dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause stand as an aberration.
B. Subnational Climate Analysis
It is hard to see how the transnational climate networks, domestic
climate, coalitions, or the nonbinding MOUs discussed above could be
challenged under the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause because these
agreements themselves do not create binding legal obligations that could be

to California’s taxation scheme); Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983)
(upholding California’s application of its tax scheme to foreign subsidiaries); see also
GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 166 (describing the Wardair decision as a “retreat
from the one-voice doctrine”); Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution,
supra note 22, at 695 (stating that the decision in Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd.
was a “break with the one-voice tradition,” as the law in question had elicited real protest
from foreign governments and yet was sustained).
445
Barclays Bank resolved matters left open in Container Corp., 463 U.S. 159, which
involved the taxation of a U.S. corporation with overseas subsidiaries incorporated in the
countries in which they operated. Barclays Bank addressed the constitutionality of
California’s taxing scheme as applied to “domestic corporations with foreign parents or [to]
foreign corporations with either foreign parents or foreign subsidiaries.” Barclays, 512 U.S
at 302 (quoting Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 189 n.26).
446
Barclays, 512 U.S at 320 (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976)).
447
Id. at 325–26.
448
Id. at 324.
449
Ingrid Wuerth, The Future of the Federal Common Law of Foreign Relations Symposium:
The Law of Nations and the United States Constitution, 106 GEO. L.J. 1825, 1830–31 (2018).
450
Wuerth, supra note 449, at 1831 (noting that the last time the Supreme Court invalidated
a law under the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause was in Kraft Gen. Foods v. Iowa Dept.
of Rev., 505 U.S. 71 (1992)).
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said to discriminate against foreign commerce. However, the Cap-and-Trade
Agreement between California and Quebec deserves scrutiny.451
As the discussion in the prior Part suggests, the Supreme Court has
considered dormant Foreign Commerce Clause challenges primarily in the
context of tax cases.452 Although it might be possible for the doctrine to apply
in other contexts, a successful challenge to California’s cap-and-trade
program would likely have to be framed in terms of tax. It is theoretically
possible to conceive of a cap-and-trade program as economically equivalent
to a tax, but they function differently in practice.453 Unlike a tax, California’s
cap-and-trade program is a market-based approach to regulating carbon. As
discussed in Part II.B.4, California’s Global Warming Solutions Act and
implementing regulations created a cap-and-trade system that issues
greenhouse gas allowances and offset credits, which in turn gives covered
entities flexibility with how to reduce their carbon emissions. Even if the capand-trade program could be conceived of as a tax, it is difficult to understand
how it could create the “enhanced risk of multiple taxation”454 that the cargo
ships in Japan Line experienced. It is also challenging to see how the program
discriminates against regulated entities; if anything, it is enhancing market
function and regulatory compliance.
Unlike the Japan Line case where the California tax was seen to
conflict with a relevant multilateral treaty,455 the California-Quebec
emissions trading program is not at odds with international climate law. The
Paris Agreement does not require the use of market-based trading programs,
but, it allows parties to meet their own targets through such means,456 thereby
encouraging the growth of international linkages from the bottom-up.457 The
rather awkward phrasing of Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement458 was
451

I assume for purposes of this analysis that all of the subnational global climate action
discussed, including the cap-and-trade program, would survive a Dormant Commerce Clause
challenge. For an analysis of potential concerns under the ordinary dormant Commerce
Clause, see Kysar & Meyler, supra note 15, at 1647.
452
See supra note 444.
453
See generally PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE POLICY MEMO #1: CAP AND
TRADE V. TAXES (2009), https://www.c2es.org/site/assets/uploads/2009/03/climate-policymemo-1-cap-and-trade-vs-taxes.pdf [https://perma.cc/FWS4-F6RD] (discussing “Similarities
Between Cap and Trade and Taxes”).
454
Japan Line v. Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 446 (1979).
455
Id. at 452–54.
456
See Paris Agreement, supra note 2, art. 6.2.
457
MEHLING, METCALF & STAVINS, supra note 160, at 2.
458
Art. 6.2 of the Paris Agreement states in part, “Parties shall, where engaging on a
voluntary basis in cooperative approaches that involve the use of internationally transferred
mitigation outcomes towards nationally determined contributions, promote sustainable
development. . ., and shall apply robust accounting to ensure, inter alia, the avoidance of
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apparently adopted, in part, to assuage concerns of the United States and
Canada, which did not want to be accountable for cross-border trading at the
subnational level due to the lack of national oversight of these systems.459
Given the lack of conflict with a treaty, it is difficult to discern a
reason why the California-Quebec emissions trading program raises concerns
about the nation speaking with “one voice.”460 Instead, this situation recalls
to mind the facts of Barclays Bank.461 Just as Congress had considered, but
rejected, legislation that would preempt state laws on the taxation of
multinational companies in Barclays Bank, Congress has considered, but
rejected, legislation that would preempt subnational emissions trading.462
C. Abandoning the Domestic Versus Foreign Distinction?
The foregoing analysis is premised on a distinction between the
domestic and foreign dormant Commerce Clauses. However, scholars have
argued that the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause should not be treated
differently from the domestic version.463 This is not such a radical idea when
one considers that no such distinction was made for almost two centuries,
until the decision in Japan Line in 1979. Glennon and Sloane challenge the
constitutional basis for a heightened standard in cases involving the dormant
Foreign Commerce Clause because nothing in the Constitution prohibits
discrimination against nations.464 In contrast, in domestic interstate dormant
Commerce Clause cases, the burdened parties are states, which have powers
reserved to them under the Tenth Amendment. As a result, Glennon and
Sloane suggest abandoning the additional two-pronged inquiry in Japan Line,
and also changing the standard to one of presumptive validity.465
The risk of retaliation has long motivated the Court’s rationale in
foreign affairs cases. Under the doctrine of state responsibility in
international law, nations are responsible for the actions of their sub-units.466
At our nation’s founding and under the Articles of Confederation, “a single
double counting. . . .” Paris Agreement, supra note 2, art. 6.2. The term “internationally
transferred mitigation outcomes” is part of the new climate jargon for emissions trading.
ANDREI MARCU ET AL., ISSUES AND OPTIONS: ELEMENTS FOR TEXT UNDER ARTICLE 6, at 3–5
(2017),
https://www.ictsd.org/themes/climate-and-energy/research/issues-and-optionselements-for-text-under-article-6-0 [https://perma.cc/ D375-EBNA].
459
MULLER, supra note 237, at 7.
460
Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 449.
461
Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 325–26 (1994).
462
Buzbee, supra note 241, at 1042.
463
GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 178.
464
Id. at 176–77.
465
Id. at 178.
466
Id. at 29 n.108; Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, supra note 22, at 1260.
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misstep by a single state could imperil the entire country.”467 During the
nineteenth century, concerns about retaliation motivated the striking down of
state laws attempting to regulate international commerce and immigration.468
Similarly, in the twentieth century, the same rationale animated the Japan
Line’s “one voice” theory.469
In today’s world, is the risk of foreign retaliation smaller? The Court
has not necessarily found retaliation to be the overriding concern. For
example, this concern did not sway the court in later dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause cases, like Barclays Bank. The decision in Medellin also
created a risk of potential retaliation against U.S. citizens in other countries,
including, for example, denial of access to U.S. consular services.470
Arguably, this was a greater risk than the issues at play in Japan Line,471 but
it did not govern the Court’s ultimate holding.
With globalization, the nature of retaliation has also changed. Spiro,
for example, has argued that, given the ability for nations to retaliate in a
targeted way against states, the “one voice” rationale is no longer
compelling.472 As an illustrative example, he points out that in response to an
earlier version of the California tax at issue in the Barclays Bank case, the U.K.
Parliament passed retaliatory legislation aimed only against corporations
registered in California and in other states with similar tax laws.473

467

GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 32.
See, e.g., Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876) (striking down a California statute
requiring bonds from certain immigrant passengers); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419 (1827)
(holding unconstitutional a state law requiring importers of foreign goods to purchase a license).
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441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979).
470
As Justice Breyer warned in his dissent:
The majority’s two holdings . . . unnecessarily complicate the President’s
foreign affairs task insofar as, for example, they increase the likelihood of
Security Council Avena enforcement proceedings, of worsening relations
with our neighbor Mexico, of precipitating actions by other nations putting
at risk American citizens who have the misfortune to be arrested while
traveling abroad, or of diminishing our Nation’s reputation abroad as a
result of our failure to follow the “rule of law” principles that we preach.
552 U.S. 491, 566 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note
8, at 174 (noting that the Medellin decision “almost certainly threated the interest of the
nation and its citizens” by risking retaliation by foreign nations).
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Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, supra note 22, at 1261–62; Spiro, Globalization
and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, supra note 22, at 688; Spiro, The States and
International Human Rights, supra note 41, at 584–86.
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Moreover, the reality is that the nation rarely speaks with one voice,
as there is often a contest between the President, Congress, and the Court.474
Indeed, the Constitution has been described as “an invitation to struggle for
the privilege of directing American foreign policy.”475 This line of reasoning
is consistent with arguments made by international law scholars. For instance,
Anne Marie Slaughter has argued that international law is better conceived
as a system of horizontal networks between disaggregated government
institutions across borders and vertical networks between national
government officials and their supranational counterparts.476
If the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is the same in the foreign
context as in the domestic context, or if the Supreme Court’s application of
the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause is truly limited to a tax case like
Japan Line, then the subnational climate activity discussed here, including
the California-Quebec emissions trading system, will be even better
positioned to survive constitutional scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
States and cities have extensive experience engaging on matters that
arguably fall within the scope of foreign affairs, including trade, tourism,
investment, agriculture, family support, and transboundary pollution.477 The
breadth of subnational engagement in foreign affairs alone does not mean
that these activities are constitutional.478 But the fact that states and cities
have entered into hundreds, perhaps even thousands, of agreements with
foreign governments in the past half-century with almost no oversight from
Congress is notable.479
Set against this backdrop, the international actions of states and cities
on climate change do not seem so extraordinary. Climate change is a
collective action problem of global dimensions that transcends national
474

Sarah Cleveland, Crosby and the “One Voice” Myth in U.S. Foreign Relations, 46 VILL.
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See Part I.A.
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sanctions against South Africa in the 1980s. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530
U.S. 363, 388 (2000).
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See Peter Spiro, The Waning Federal Monopoly over Foreign Relations, LAWFARE (Jan. 9,
2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/waning-federal-monopoly-over-foreign-relations [https://
perma.cc/XX77-CFXJ] (suggesting examples of foreign affairs federalism “from practice
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borders. Dismissing agreements between states and foreign governments or
interstate agreements that have clear foreign implications as legally
meaningless because they purport to be nonbinding misses an important
dimension of international law.480 The Westphalian model of nation-states as
the only salient actors in international law has been challenged by scholars
and defied by reality. Even ostensibly political actions by states and cities in
support of a treaty, such as the Paris Agreement, can enable them to act as
norm sustainers of international law.481 The concept of subnational norm
sustaining helps to explain how subnational governments can strengthen
international legal norms that have been rejected by national governments.
City and state norm sustaining behavior runs counter to the notion that the
national government has “exclusive” authority over foreign affairs and that
the nation should speak with “one voice.”
Scholars of foreign affairs law have long observed that the nation
rarely speaks with just one voice.482 In addition, although the federal
government theoretically has plenary power over foreign affairs, the
Constitution does not contain an express prohibition against states engaging
internationally. Thus, unless the federal government affirmatively takes
action, such as through preemption, states and cities can engage in foreign
affairs within boundaries that are not always clearly demarcated. The analysis
of four specific examples of subnational action on global climate change
highlights this grey zone of foreign affairs federalism.483
The questions raised in this Article are not merely theoretical because,
as this Article was being finalized for publication, the Trump administration
sued California over its Cap-and-Trade Agreement with Quebec. This Article
addresses the major legal issues raised in the complaint.484
The one and only time the Supreme Court has invalidated an
agreement between a state and a foreign government was in 1840 and the
plurality opinion did not agree whether it violated the Compact or Treaty
Clause.485 Further, when considering agreements between states, the
Supreme Court has retreated from a literal interpretation of the clause and
given up on attempts to distinguish among key terms, such as the difference
between a treaty, an agreement, and a compact. Under the Compact Clause,
Congress has the explicit power to regulate interstate compacts and those
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between states and foreign nations.486 Yet, for the most part, it has not
exercised this power; there is not even a formal mechanism for Congress to
be notified when a state enters into an agreement that might implicate the
Compact Clause. Rather than apply the requirement of congressional consent
literally, the Supreme Court has developed a functional test for interstate
compacts that assesses the power of the state versus the national government.
It has also identified classic indicia of a compact, such as whether a joint body
is created or whether the state is free to reject the rules or withdraw from the
agreement. Most experts believe that this interstate Compact Clause doctrine
now applies to agreements with foreign nations.
Applying this functional test to the foreign context, credible
arguments can be made that the four examples of subnational global climate
action discussed earlier enhance the power of the state at the expense of the
national government and may run afoul of the Compact Clause.487 Ultimately,
however, I conclude that such agreements and alliances would survive
potential challenges. Even the California-Quebec agreement creating a linked
cap-and-trade program is not dissimilar to other forms of cross-border
cooperation, such as those on the Great Lakes and regarding motor vehicle
regulation. However, if the underlying assumption is incorrect, and the
Supreme Court was inclined to interpret the Compact Clause literally for
agreements with foreign powers, then many forms of subnational engagement
on foreign affairs, including on climate change, would be constitutionally
suspect.488 The ongoing litigation about California’s Cap-and-Trade
Agreement with Quebec will test these assumptions.
With respect to the Supremacy Clause, neither Congress nor the
President has expressly preempted the kinds of transnational networks,
domestic coalitions, or bilateral agreements on climate change discussed in this
Article.489 The climate context is distinguishable from the seminal foreign affairs
preemption cases because there is no conflicting congressional statute or
executive agreement.490 In fact, the actions of states and cities are broadly
consistent with the UNFCCC, a treaty that the U.S. Senate consented to ratify,
and the Clean Air Act, which applies to greenhouse gas regulation. Even though
President Trump has indicated that he seeks to re-negotiate the terms of the
treaty, the bargaining chip theory—a key rationale of preemption cases—does
not make sense after the Supreme Court’s holding in Massachusetts v. EPA, or
in light of the bottom-up/top-down structure of the Paris Agreement.
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As there is neither a statute nor an executive agreement that creates a
clear conflict with subnational climate action, President Trump would have
to rest a preemption argument on the basis of his foreign policy decision to
withdraw from the Paris Agreement and on his dormant foreign affairs
power.491 This is a difficult argument. Moreover, in cases involving questions
of dormant executive power over foreign affairs, the Supreme Court
determined that the real purpose of the state laws was not to regulate in areas
of traditional state authority, such as insurance and probate, but to influence
U.S. diplomacy.492 In contrast, states and cities are motivated to engage on
climate change to protect the health and welfare of their citizens; they engage
globally because climate change is a challenging collective action problem.
If the potential trend towards normalization in the field of foreign
affairs law continues, then the Supreme Court may determine that subnational
global climate action should not be preempted.493 The field of human rights
offers comparable insights because, like in the climate context, cities have rebranded their local actions as in support of human rights treaties and sought to
participate in international processes.494 Moreover, because the United States has
adopted several human rights treaties with explicit federalism understandings,
scholars have offered ways to reconcile the kinds of conflicting national and
subnational positions that are also seen in the climate field.
Finally, the Article considers the dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause.495 Of the different kinds of subnational action on global climate
change considered in this paper, only the California-Quebec agreement on
cap-and-trade raises possible concern. However, the dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause doctrine has primarily been applied to cases involving
taxes, and it is difficult to see how the cross-border emissions trading
program creates a risk of multiple taxation. In a seminal case, the Supreme
Court’s finding that the United States must speak with one voice was
influenced by U.S. participation in a treaty whose terms conflicted with the
state law at issue. In contrast, because the Paris Agreement supports the use
of emissions trading, the agreement between California and Quebec is
arguably consistent with an international treaty.496
Scholars have also made convincing arguments for abandoning the
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause’s two-pronged test, which focuses on the
risk of multiple taxation and the need for the nation to speak with one
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voice.497 Although the Supreme Court has said that greater scrutiny should
be applied in foreign cases, this presumption should arguably be reversed.
Under the Constitution, foreign nations do not have rights reserved to them,
as do states burdened in an interstate dispute. Moreover, globalization has
allowed for greater targeted retaliation, obviating the need for the nation to
always speak with one voice. Thus, while subnational action on global
climate change would likely survive a dormant Foreign Commerce Clause
challenge as currently understood, strong normative arguments exist for not
even subjecting this activity to a heightened standard.
The foregoing analysis suggests that the federal government has not
taken constitutionally-sufficient steps to prevent or preempt the transnational
networks, domestic coalitions, memoranda of understanding, and bilateral
agreements that states and cities have pursued on global climate change. If
the analysis is correct, then the types of subnational global climate action
discussed in this Article would likely survive constitutional scrutiny. Holding
otherwise would also call into question a host of other cross-border activity
by states and cities.
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